

White Paper

**THE JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH ARRESTS AND THE
THREAT OF TERRORISM**

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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS USED

ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
DI	Darul Islam
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka
IILF	Indonesian Islamic Liberation Front
IRCC	Inter-Racial Confidence Circle
JI	Jemaah Islamiyah
KMM	Kumpulan Militan Malaysia
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MMI	Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In December 2001, the Internal Security Department (ISD) arrested 15 persons, of whom 13 were members of a radical, regional Islamic group called Jemaah Islamiyah (JI or "Islamic community"). The 13 JI members were detained whilst the remaining 2 were released in January 2002 on Restriction Order. At the time of the arrests, members of this group had been planning a series of bomb attacks in Singapore that would have had catastrophic consequences. JI, however, is only one of several radical militant groups active in Southeast Asia. Many of these groups, which claim to act in the name of Islam, have close ties with Al-Qaeda, the global terrorist organisation responsible for the attacks on the US in September 2001.

In August 2002, ISD arrested another 21 persons, all of whom, except two, were members of the JI. These two persons were members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a militant separatist group in the Philippines, which has close links with the JI. 18 of them were detained whilst the remaining 3, including 2 JI members and one MILF member, were released in September 2002 on Restriction Order.

The bombings in Bali on 12 October 2002 are believed to have been perpetrated by the JI. It underlines the continuing threat that terror organisations like the JI pose to the region. The persistence of this network of terror means that Singaporeans cannot remain complacent about its threats. More generally, Singaporeans must remain committed to the ideal of a harmonious and tolerant multi-ethnic and multi-religious society, in order to prevent dangerous, radical ideas from taking root in Singapore.

This White Paper is divided into five main sections, apart from its introduction and conclusion. Section I surveys the various self-proclaimed Islamic terrorist groups in Southeast Asia and describes the web of relationships that link them together. Section II delves specifically into JI and its ties with Al-Qaeda and other radical militant groups in the region. Section III describes the development of JI in Singapore, its main terrorist plans here, and the motivations of its members. Section IV outlines the report and recommendations of the Internal Security Act Advisory Board that met to consider the case of the JI detainees. Section V looks ahead to consider how Singapore may protect its people from the threat of terrorism.

INTRODUCTION

The arrests of 15 persons in December 2001 and another 21 persons in August 2002 by the Internal Security Department (ISD) exposed the most serious direct threat posed by any terrorist organisation to Singapore's security since the days of the Communist Party of Malaya. Of the 15 persons arrested in December 2001, 13 Jemaah Islamiyah (JI or 'Islamic Community') members were detained and the remaining 2 released on Restriction Order in January 2002. Of the 21 persons arrested in August 2002, 3 were released on Restriction Order in September 2002 and the remaining 18, comprising 17 JI members and one Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) member, were detained. This White Paper gives an account of the JI case and describes various radical, self-proclaimed Islamic groups in Southeast Asia and the threats that they pose to Singapore.

ISD's arrests disrupted JI's plans to bomb certain targets in Singapore. However, the arrests have not completely eliminated the JI threat. Some members of the JI network are now believed to be hiding in neighbouring countries and may reactivate their earlier bombing plans. On 13 December 2001, Indonesian JI leader Hambali met some of these JI members in Johor and encouraged them to proceed with plans to bomb targets in Singapore to retaliate for the arrests.

JI is not the only terrorist group active in Southeast Asia. Other similar organisations in the region continue to pose a threat, either directly or together with operatives and

"sleepers"¹ of the international terrorist organisation, Al-Qaeda ('The Base'). Such groups threaten the safety of Singaporeans and the cohesion of Singapore society. Because these groups exploit the teachings of Islam to justify their actions, any acts of violence that they perpetrate will inevitably undermine inter-ethnic trust and unravel the general communal harmony and peace that Singaporeans enjoy today.

In his address at the opening of Singapore's 10th Parliament on 25 March 2002, the President explained that while the plans of JI have been thwarted in Singapore, the scourge of terrorism has not been eliminated. Singapore continues to be at risk to terrorist attacks. He said:

"The Taleban and Al-Qaeda may have been routed in Afghanistan, but global terrorism is far from defeated. Terrorist cells, linked to global networks, exist in many countries, including in Southeast Asia. The Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist group is a stark reminder that these are not faraway problems, but immediate threats to us here and now. The danger to us is twofold. Firstly, we are directly at risk of terrorist attacks, especially by Islamic terrorist groups originating elsewhere in the region. Such attacks will cause suspicion and arouse enmity between our races. Secondly, the US action against global terrorism may cause repercussions in Muslim countries, and complicate the situation in Southeast Asia."

¹ "Sleepers" are operatives who assimilate into their local community and keep a low profile until activated for a mission or task.

(I) THE THREAT OF TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Many analysts have pointed to Southeast Asia as the new theatre for terrorist operations for Islamic extremist groups.² However, terrorism is not a new phenomenon in this region. Militant self-proclaimed Islamic terrorist groups have long existed in several countries in the region, with many espousing a separatist Islamic agenda. In addition to these indigenous groups, terrorist groups from outside the region have used Southeast Asia as a safe haven and for transit points and procurement sites. Such groups have included the Japanese Red Army, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the Hizbollah, and, more recently, Al-Qaeda.

Al-Qaeda is by far the most dangerous of these groups. Several Al-Qaeda operatives who participated in the bombing of the *USS Cole* in Aden in October 2000 and in the 11 September 2001 attacks in the US have visited countries in this region, including Malaysia. These visits were probably sponsored, at least in part, by indigenous militant Islamic groups in the region, including JI.

Because of their links with Al-Qaeda, the regional groups have become more radical and extreme in their ideology, methods and capabilities. They have also blended Al-Qaeda's agenda of global *jihād* ('holy

struggle')³ against Americans and other enemies of Islam into their own local agendas.

A survey of the recent activities of militant Islamic groups in the region attests to their increasing radicalisation. In August 2001, the Malaysian police discovered a group called *Kumpulan Militan Malaysia* (KMM, or 'Malaysian Militant Group'), when they arrested several KMM members for a string of violent crimes. The KMM aimed to transform Malaysia into an Islamic state through violent means. The Philippines has also seen an upsurge in separatist violence in its restive southern provinces. Despite peace talks, Philippine security forces continue to clash with hardline elements in the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) demanding independence for the southern region of Mindanao. There are also security problems from the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which claims to fight for independence in Mindanao, but has mainly engaged in kidnapping-for-ransom. In southern Thailand, Muslim separatist groups such as the New Pattani United Liberation Organisation, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional and the Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Pattani want an independent Islamic Pattani state. In Singapore, members of the JI network arrested in December 2001

² FBI Director Robert Mueller and terrorism expert Dr Rohan Gunaratna are among those who have made this assertion. An article in *The Straits Times (ST)* "Al-Qaeda links in S-E Asia still worry US" on 16 March 2002 reported that South East Asia remained an area of concern for the US because the full extent of support for the Al-Qaeda terrorism network in the region was not yet known despite the arrests of dozens of militants. Mueller was quoted as saying that "countries in the region could be fertile ground for the Al-Qaeda". According to another *ST* article "Jemaah Islamiyah created as Al-Qaeda's pan-Asian outfit" on 25 January 2002, Dr Rohan Gunaratna of the University of St. Andrews described JI as a group "set up by Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda network specifically to attack Western targets in Asia and advance its objectives in the region". He highlighted that "many of the terrorists trained in Afghanistan have moved to theatres of conflict in the region and are in the neighbourhood".

³ The term *jihād*, in its primary meaning, describes striving for a good cause, namely the cause of God through disciplining oneself to control one's desires such as greed, anger and lust. Military action in the context of *jihād* refers to an act of defence, not offence, such as defending one's country against aggressors or to defend the religion. It is therefore a sub-group of *jihād* and not its totality. However, groups such as Al Qaeda have distorted the meaning of *jihād* and applied them to their violent military struggle against non-Muslims; a struggle that in fact violates the true teachings of Islam.

disclosed that their original vision of an Islamic Indonesia had in recent years expanded into a vision for a Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara (Islamic state or archipelago) consisting of Malaysia, Indonesia and Mindanao, into which Singapore and Brunei would inevitably be absorbed.

The radicalisation of these various groups has occurred during a period of growing Islamisation in the region. The last two decades have seen the rise of a more assertive, severe and conservative brand of Islam imported from the Middle East and the Indian sub-continent. These teachings have significantly influenced Muslim communities in Southeast Asia, and resulted in more Muslims becoming stricter and more orthodox in matters of diet, dress, religious observances and social interactions.

In countries with significant Muslim populations, Islam has become a powerful political force. Political contenders with Islamic leanings invariably invoke Islam as part of their persona and agenda to bolster their political legitimacy and populist appeal. These trends have fostered a favourable environment for extremists and terrorists acting in the name of Islam, and have created more opportunities for them to spread their radical ideas and recruit new members.

The Terrorist "Brotherhood"

Perhaps the most significant factor in the radicalisation of the militant Islamic groups in the region was their involvement in the *jihād* against the Soviet Union in the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989). The war provided opportunities for key figures of these groups who went to Afghanistan to experience firsthand the glory of *jihād* and its eventual victory over the Soviet Union. Indeed, many of the radicals detained in Singapore and Malaysia derived their ideological inspiration from the activities of the *mujahidin* ('warriors') in Afghanistan and Pakistan.⁴

⁴ After the Soviet-Afghan War ended, new sites for *jihād* were developed. In Southeast Asia, the epicentre for *jihād* was Ambon in the Malukus. There, Muslims were exhorted to join the *jihādists* to fight against the Christians, to defend the *ummah* (Islamic community) and recover the

In Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda taught these key figures sophisticated terrorist tradecraft and expertise. After they returned to Southeast Asia, they transferred the skills to other members of their organisations. Their shared experience training in Afghanistan also fostered links among these leaders, and between them and their Al-Qaeda trainers and mentors. Collectively, they formed a loose but trusted "brotherhood" of militants and *mujahidin* fighters that supported each other if any need arose. For example, the Indonesian Islamic Liberation Front (IILF) has helped to raise funds for the MILF in the Philippines through smuggling and illegal logging. Through a long standing agreement, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), a group active in Indonesia's Aceh province, sent its recruits to MILF's Camp Abu Bakar for guerrilla warfare training. JI was also known to have its own camp within Camp Abu Bakar.

The relationship between the Al-Qaeda and the leaders of these indigenous South East Asian groups continued actively after the Soviet-Afghan War. Even while Taleban Afghanistan provided sanctuary for the Al-Qaeda to conduct terrorist training for members of such militant groups from all over the world, the Al-Qaeda leaders were already searching for new training bases elsewhere, including in South East Asia. They also secreted key operatives like Omar Al-Faruq into South East Asia. Several operatives acquired new identities indigenous to these countries. They acted as "sleepers" as well as advisers and resource persons who transferred funds and expert knowledge on terrorist tradecraft, including bomb-making, to the local groups linked to the Al-Qaeda. In addition, there are indications that some of the local leaders were co-opted into the Al-Qaeda organisation even as they continued to hold their positions in their indigenous organisations. Some analysts believe that the JI is the group which enjoys the closest relationship with the Al-Qaeda organisation in the region.

land which they see as belonging to Muslims. According to various reports, as many as 5,000 people have died in the religious clashes in the Malukus since 1999.

In 1999, the JI regional leadership formed a secret caucus called the Rabitatul Mujahidin (Mujahidin Coalition) to bring together the key leaders of the various militant Islamic groups in the region. Representatives from the MILF, JI, various extremist groups active in Aceh and Sulawesi in Indonesia, as well as the Rohingyaas (a predominantly Muslim ethnic group in Myanmar), attended the Rabitatul Mujahidin's meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 2000.

Through this brotherhood of Afghanistan/Al-Qaeda "alumni", Al-Qaeda enjoys secure, reliable and easy access into South East Asia. For instance, the two Al-Qaeda operatives who eventually crashed a plane into the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 stayed with Malaysian JI member Yazid Sufaat when they visited Malaysia in January 2000. Yazid and another Malaysian JI member Faiz Bafana are also believed to have provided assistance to Zacarias Moussaoui (the French national of Moroccan descent, currently indicted in the US for his involvement in the September 2001 attacks) when Zacarias visited Malaysia in September and October 2000.

Even before 11 September 2001, Al-Qaeda had already extended its tentacles into South East Asia. In the Philippines, Al-Qaeda provided funds and training to the ASG and MILF through a network of front organisations and legitimate Muslim organisations.

In Indonesia, Al-Qaeda has links with two organisations – Laskar Jihad ('Army of Jihad' or 'Holy War Warriors') and the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, or 'Indonesian Mujahidin Council'). Laskar Jihad leader Jafar Umar Thalib had previously met Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and studied with Osama's associates in Pakistan. Although Jafar Omar claimed that he had no links to Osama, the Laskar Jihad was one of the most

active militant groups preaching and pursuing *jihād* against Christians in Ambon.⁵ The Indonesian cleric Abu Bakar Bashir, who is the ideological leader of the entire JI regional network covering Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Australia, has openly praised Osama while denying any outright ties.

Key Indonesian JI figures such as Riduan Isamuddin @ Nurjaman @ Hambali (Hambali) and Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi @ "Mike" are also clearly linked to Al-Qaeda members and activities in the region. Hambali is the regional link-man for Al-Qaeda and enjoyed personal access to Mohd Atef @ Abu Hafs, one of Osama's trusted aides. Hambali is wanted by Malaysian authorities for his involvement in terrorist activities, including the murder of Kedah State Assemblyman Joe Fernandez in 2000.

Al-Qaeda's links with the regional brotherhood of militant Islamic groups have given it a strong foothold in South East Asia. The US-led military campaign in Afghanistan may have disrupted its bases there, but Al-Qaeda is still able to launch terrorist attacks by tapping the network of militant groups in the region. As investigations into JI revealed, some Singapore Muslims have already been drawn into this web of terrorism.

Even if the US succeeds in dismantling Al-Qaeda, radical Muslim groups in the region will continue to pursue Al-Qaeda's agenda of global *jihād*. Some of these groups were started well before Al-Qaeda, and have stubbornly persisted over the years. With their radical agenda and their enhanced skills acquired from Al-Qaeda, these groups, if left unchecked, will pose a grave threat to the security of South East Asia for a long time to come.

⁵ . After the Bali bombing on 12 October 2002, Laskar Jihad announced that it will disband. The group's current status is uncertain.

(II) THE JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH NETWORK

The JI Organisation: Historical Background

Historically, JI traces its roots to the Darul Islam (DI, or 'House of Islam'), an organisation which emerged in the 1940s and which fought together with the Indonesian revolutionary army against Dutch colonial rule. After Indonesia gained independence in 1949, DI continued its armed and violent struggle for the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia.

The Indonesian government tried to suppress the group after independence but never completely succeeded. In 1985, several radical DI elements fled to Malaysia to avoid arrest by the Suharto government. They settled there, and later regrouped and renamed themselves Jemaah Islamiyah. They expanded the group's membership through recruitment in Singapore and Malaysia. After the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, several of these JI leaders returned to Indonesia.

The key DI leaders who fled to Malaysia and formed JI included Abu Bakar Bashir and the late Abdullah Sungkar. Abdullah Sungkar laid the groundwork for close ties between JI and Al-Qaeda when he went to Afghanistan to participate in the Soviet-Afghan War. He later sent groups of JI members to Afghanistan to train with Al-Qaeda.

When Abdullah Sungkar died in 1999, Abu Bakar Bashir took over the leadership of JI. Ibrahim Maidin, the first Singapore JI leader, took his oath of allegiance (*bai'ah*)⁶ to Bashir himself and formed the Singapore JI branch. The Singapore branch reported to the Malaysian JI leadership. Other key figures in the core JI leadership in the region include Abu Jibril, who was arrested in Malaysia in June 2001 for terrorist activities, and Hambali, the link-man with Al-Qaeda.

⁶ The *bai'ah* is one psychological tactic used by JI leaders to control and manipulate their followers. More details of these tactics are in page 20.

The JI Organisation: Objectives and Strategy

The JI's ultimate objective is to create a Daulah Islamiyah (Islamic state) in the region through the use of violence. This Daulah Islamiyah would be centred in Indonesia but would include Malaysia, south Philippines and, inevitably, Singapore and Brunei. This vision was spelt out in a JI manual known as *Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Jemaah Islamiyah* (PUPJI or "General Guidelines of the Struggle of Jemaah Islamiyah"). In addition, the JI shares the virulent anti-West ideology of global *jihad* purveyed by the Al-Qaeda, and its close links to the Al-Qaeda have made it a willing proxy to attack the US and other targets.

To sustain its activities, the JI developed a sophisticated structure of finances and businesses. The JI had an economic wing, which was tasked to generate long-term sources of funds and income to finance JI activities and operations. This unit, known as the *iqtisod* (economic wing), operated at both the regional and local levels and apparently dealt with JI's businesses and formulated business "strategies" for the JI organisation. It would appear that at least some of the JI businesses were part of a long-term strategy to set up companies to facilitate JI's clandestine activities, including the procurement of materials.

All JI-run businesses had to contribute 10% of their total earnings to the group. This money was to be channelled into JI's special fund called *Infaq Fisabilillah* (contributions for the Islamic cause or *jihad* fund). Control over disbursement resided principally in the JI operations leader, Hambali. Besides operations, money from *Infaq Fisabilillah* was used to sponsor JI members' transport and training in Afghanistan and Mindanao, to purchase arms and explosives and for other general purposes such as providing financial assistance to JI-run madrasahs.

The JI Organisation: Operationalising Attacks

Around 1999 or 2000, the JI leadership stepped up efforts to recruit more JI members into the operations cells and to prepare them for military training abroad. Hambali had instructed that all JI groups (missionary work, economy etc.) be converted into operations cells and that as many members as possible be sent for training in Afghanistan or Mindanao. In compliance with this instruction, the Singapore JI network disbanded its *dakwah* (missionary) and other non-operations cells/units and deployed its members for training. In Malaysia, the JI training also changed from fitness type training to terrorism-related training.

The first indication of the operationalisation of this instruction in the JI network was in 1999 when JI formed a regional alliance of *jihād* or *mujahidin* groups called the Rabitatul Mujahidin (Mujahidin Coalition). The JI *amir* (supreme leader) Abu Bakar Bashir had initiated this alliance in the hope that the groups could co-operate and share resources for training, procurement of arms, financial assistance and terrorist operations. The groups in this alliance included the MILF, an unnamed self-exiled Rohingyas group based in Bangladesh and an unnamed *jihād* group based in south Thailand. The objective was to unite the militant groups in the region and to use this platform to realise the Daulah Islamiyah.

Rabitatul Mujahidin reportedly met 3 times between 1999 and late 2000; all the meetings were held in Malaysia amidst great secrecy. Some time in 2000, Rabitatul Mujahidin decided to attack Philippines interests in Indonesia. The bomb that subsequently went off outside the Philippine Ambassador's home in Jakarta in August 2000 killed 2 and injured 20. Hambali was apparently the brain behind this attack, which was sanctioned and co-ordinated by the Rabitatul Mujahidin; the idea was apparently to retaliate against the Philippines Government's clampdown on the MILF.

The first clearly JI terrorist operation was likely to be the one mounted in December 2000 which involved the simultaneous bombing of churches in several Indonesian cities on Christmas Eve. This project was planned and co-ordinated by Hambali. Two Singapore JI members participated in this operation. They went to Johor for briefings before making their way to Batam to execute the bombings. In the same month, JI also bombed the Light Railway Train in Manila; 22 people were killed. According to the Philippines police investigations, JI bomb-maker Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi (who had directed Singapore JI to conduct reconnaissance of the US Embassy and other targets in October 2001) was responsible for the bombing. Fathur revealed that this bombing assignment was funded by the JI.



Logo of Rabitatul Mujahidin

The JI Network: Links with Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia

Abu Bakar Bashir currently heads the MMI, which was formed in 2000. The MMI is a reincarnation of DI (now JI) and aims to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. It is believed to have played a key role in anti-Christian violence in the Maluku.

The MMI's military wing is Laskar Jundullah ('Army of Allah'), an anti-American group notorious for its "sweepings" for Americans⁷. The other MMI affiliate was Laskar Jihad, one of the biggest and best organised militant groups with 52 branches throughout Indonesia and more than 50,000 members. In July 2001, MMI played host to an Al-Qaeda emissary who was seeking to develop ties with Indonesian groups like Laskar Jihad.⁸

The JI Network: Links with Kumpulan Militan Malaysia

JI has close ties with the Malaysian group KMM. JI leaders Abu Bakar Bashir and Hambali are both wanted by the Malaysian police for KMM crimes, including the murder of Kedah politician Joe Fernandez in November 2000.⁹ Singapore JI member Othman Mohamed assisted the KMM in buying a boat to support *jihād* activities in Indonesia. In turn, KMM helped JI to obtain ammonium nitrate to make bombs. KMM (and JI) member Yazid Sufaat had earlier purchased four tonnes of ammonium nitrate, which KMM made available

⁷ This refers to occasions where Indonesian militants forcibly raided hotels for American tourists. For example, between October and November 2000, Laskar Jundullah militants raided hotels in Surakarta in Central Java and demanded that the American guests leave Indonesia. In September 2001, Laskar Jundullah and other Islamic groups searched five-star hotels in Surakarta for Americans and insisted that US citizens leave Indonesia if the US were to attack Afghanistan (*Jakarta Post*, 24 September 2001).

⁸ See terrorism expert Dr Rohan Gunaratna's article "Al-Qaeda: The Asian Connection" in *The Straits Times* (4 January 2002).

⁹ The Malaysian Inspector-General of Police Tan Sri Norian Mai was reported in *The Straits Times* (18 August 2001) to have said that Bashir and Hambali were among five people wanted in connection with Fernandez's murder.

to Singapore JI members for bombing targets in Singapore.

To date, Malaysian authorities have arrested about 60 KMM members, several of whom are also believed to be JI members, for their involvement in terrorism and crime. In addition, as many as 200 KMM members may be on the run. It is likely that these elements will find support and help from the JI network in the region.

The JI Network: Links with Moro Islamic Liberation Front

Co-operation between JI and MILF is most evident in the area of training. Some time in 1997, MILF allowed JI to set up its own training facility within Camp Abu Bakar. This JI camp, known as Camp Hidaybiyya, was run by Indonesian JI members. Training within this camp ranged from the basic to more specialised training in explosives-handling. Several of the Singaporean JI members arrested had learnt to handle revolvers and M16 rifles in this camp. The camp was specially reserved for JI training only and was closed to the rest of the trainees in the MILF's Camp Abu Bakar.

Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi, a key Indonesian JI member, served as a demolitions expert and explosives trainer with the MILF. He was the main liaison officer between JI and the MILF and would receive Singapore and Malaysia JI members travelling to Mindanao. Fathur Rohman had played a key role in directing Singapore JI members to plan attacks on US and other Western-linked establishments in Singapore in October 2001, following a plan by an Al-Qaeda operative codenamed "Sammy".

The JI Network: Links with Al-Qaeda

JI's links with Al-Qaeda began in the 1980s after the late Abdullah Sungkar visited Afghanistan to pave the way for Indonesian DI members to participate in the Soviet-Afghan War. From the 1990s, selected JI recruits trained in Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. Singapore JI recruits were encouraged to visit Afghanistan to witness first-hand the fruits of

the *jihād* there and to undergo training in explosives and weapons handling. At least one recruit attended a course on planning and executing assassinations.

The discovery of a JI-made video of the vicinity of Yishun Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) station in the Afghanistan home of Mohamed Atef @ Abu Haf, Osama's close aide, underscores the intimate ties between JI and Al-Qaeda. In 1999, Al-Qaeda leaders watched this video and heard from Singapore JI member Khalim Jaffar on his plan to attack US citizens in Singapore. They apparently instructed JI to obtain explosives and shortlist men to execute the attacks. After viewing the video, Al-Qaeda leader Mohamed Atef @ Abu Haf gave JI the

go-ahead for the attack. However, the plan was eventually not pursued, for unknown reasons. It was also Al-Qaeda that sent its operatives into Singapore in October 2001 to conduct a final reconnaissance of US targets for attack. Al-Qaeda operative "Sammy" (identified to be a Canadian national of Arab descent, Mohd Mansour Jabarah; currently in US custody) was in Singapore together with "Mike" (identified to be Indonesian national Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi, currently in jail in the Philippines) to direct Singapore JI's *fiah* Musa ("*fiah*" means "cell") in preparation for this plan. "Sammy" arrived in Singapore sometime in October 2001 and met Singapore JI members to instruct them to prepare for attacks against selected US and other targets in Singapore.




Chart of JI's links with foreign organisations

(III) THE SINGAPORE JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH CASE


The Origins and Development of JI in Singapore

The Singapore JI branch was started by Ibrahim Maidin, a self-taught and charismatic religious teacher. He was inducted into JI in 1988-89 by Abu Jibril, (currently under detention in Malaysia), who was then a religious preacher who frequently taught in Singapore. Ibrahim Maidin took the *bai'ah* under Bashir, and was subsequently appointed leader of JI in Singapore. From the early 1990s onwards, he took over the running of religious classes in Singapore from Abu Jibril. He was also subsequently appointed as a member to the *syura* ('consultative council') of the regional JI leadership.

In 1993, Ibrahim Maidin underwent military training in Afghanistan for about 20 days. His encounters with the *mujahidin* who had liberated Afghanistan deeply impressed him. He wrote several letters to Taleban supreme leader Mullah Mohammad Omar and Al-Qaeda

leader Osama and asked whether Mullah Omar was to be regarded as the "Caliph" (leader) of the Islamic world. He even entertained the idea of Singapore Muslims migrating to Afghanistan to live in what he saw as a truly Islamic state. After returning to Singapore, he arranged for JI members to visit Afghanistan and to undergo training there.

In Singapore, JI is headed by a *qoid wakalah* ('leader') who is advised by a *syura* comprising several senior members. Until 1999, Ibrahim Maidin was the *qoid wakalah*. Ibrahim was largely responsible for developing JI's Singapore branch. He instilled discipline in members and took great care to maintain the secrecy of the organisation and the loyalty of its members, most of whom he had recruited himself. Even after Mas Selamat bin Kastari (a Singaporean who remains at large) formally took over as *qoid wakalah*, Ibrahim Maidin continued to act as the spiritual leader and wielded great influence over the organisation.



Organisation Structure of Jemaah Islamiyah

The JI organisation has five functional units: operations, security, missionary work, economy (fund raising) and communications. The group also has a separate women's wing. The Singapore JI leadership is subordinate to the Malaysian JI leadership as Singapore is deemed a part of the Malaysian JI organisation. Similarly, the Australian JI branch comes under the Indonesian JI leadership.

The Principal Terrorist Plans

The earliest plans of Singapore JI members to attack targets in Singapore date back to the mid-1990s, long before the events of September 2001. Preparations for attacks intensified after 11 September 2001. In October 2001, Ibrahim Maidin conducted a survey of selected JI members to gauge their willingness to carry out various tasks for the *jihad* cause in Afghanistan. These tasks included offering prayers, contributing money and ideas, undertaking sabotage activities inside and outside Singapore, and sacrificing one's life for the cause (*'istimata*).

Several operations cells of JI were actively involved in preparing for attacks against targets in Singapore. These cells (or "*fiah*", as they are known in JI) were called *fiah* Ayub, *fiah* Musa, *fiah* Ismail and *fiah* Yakub. All four believed that they would not actually carry out the attacks but would only provide logistical support to foreign terrorists who would execute the actual attacks. However, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks later inspired *fiah* Ayub to be directly involved in the facilitation of the attacks.

The various plans for attacks in Singapore involved a range of targets from Western establishments/personnel to local assets. In line with JI's subscription to Al-Qaeda's agenda of a universal *jihad* against the "Western oppressors" of Islam, the JI was willing to assist the Al-Qaeda to prepare for attacks against Western targets. In addition, in pursuit of the JI's ultimate vision of Daulah Islamiyah, Hambali was preparing JI members in Malaysia and Singapore to mount a series of terrorist incidents at the right time. Hambali's aim was to create a situation in Malaysia and Singapore, which would be conducive to

overthrowing the Malaysian Government and provoking a revolution that would turn Malaysia into an Islamic state. Hambali's plan was to attack key Singapore installations and to represent them as acts of aggression by the Malaysian Government. Hambali wanted to provoke distrust and animosity between a "Muslim Malaysia" and a "Chinese Singapore" and cause ethnic strife in both countries. Hambali's hope was that Muslims in both Malaysia and Singapore would then respond to calls for *jihad* and turn Malaysia and Singapore into another Ambon.

Preparations for Terrorist Plans: Western Targets





Since the mid-1990s, Singapore JI leaders and members of the operations cells have discussed various potential targets for attacks. In all, JI had at least six different plans to sabotage targets in Singapore. In making these plans, JI relied heavily on video-reconnaissance of the targets, usually making recordings over several visits and making a final composite video for final preparations and planning. ISD found five such videos in the homes of the JI members, including the master copy of the Yishun MRT video that US troops discovered in Afghanistan.¹⁰

Of the several plans discussed, three were relatively well-developed.

First: in 1997, Singapore JI member Khalim Jaffar (leader of the *fiah* Ayub) conceived a plan to attack a shuttle-bus that conveyed US military personnel and their families in the Sembawang area to the Yishun MRT station. By 1999, the plan was well drawn up. Khalim, who was training in Afghanistan at that time, was invited to brief Al-Qaeda leaders about the plan. Although Al-Qaeda seemed interested, the plan was subsequently not pursued for unknown reasons.

¹⁰ . After the arrest of the first group of JI detainees beginning 9 December 2001, the US alerted ISD to the existence of this video and later provided a copy of it to ISD on 28 December 2001.

The Singapore
Jemaah Islamiyah Case



Four pieces of notes found in Afghanistan and conveyed by the US to Singapore in December 2001. These notes contained information on the Yishun Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) station and the shuttle bus service which ferried the US military personnel to the station. The note in Arabic contained information like the frequency of the shuttle bus service and the traffic system in Singapore.

At Indonesian JI leader Hambali's instruction, Malaysian JI member Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana (detained in January 2002) had conveyed Fiah Ayub's videotape of the reconnaissance of the vicinity of Yishun MRT station to Al-Qaeda member Mohamed Atef @ Abu Hafz sometime in 1999. Later, in 1999, Khalim Jaffar (detained in January 2002) was invited to meet with Al-Qaeda leaders, including Abu Hafz, while he was in Afghanistan on training. He briefed the Al-Qaeda leaders (in English because they did not speak Malay and Khalim's command of Arabic was limited) and provided notes and diagrams of the location of the Yishun MRT station to explain his plan. The notes found in Afghanistan are believed to be the same ones Khalim had helped to draw up while he was in Afghanistan in 1999.


Second: after 11 September 2001, the Al-Qaeda operative "Sammy" approached JI members belonging to *fiah* Musa with a plan to use truck bombs to attack targets in Singapore, including the US and Israeli Embassies, the Australian and British High Commissions and commercial buildings housing US firms. The plan was to launch the attacks in December 2001/January 2002 or April/May 2002. Singapore JI members had already taken steps to procure 17 tonnes of ammonium nitrate for the manufacture of the truck bombs when they were arrested in December 2001.

Third: from around the mid-1990s, Singapore JI members had considered attacking US naval vessels in Singapore. These plans were revived in early 2001 when two foreign operatives approached a Malaysian JI leader, who in turn approached Singapore JI members, for information on US military vessels in Singapore.

See Annex A for details of the various plans of attack.

Preparations for Terrorist Plans: Singapore Targets

The JI also considered several Singapore targets for attack. These potential targets included water pipelines (including those at the Causeway), the Changi Airport and the radar station at Biggin Hill. These targets were in fact surveyed and some of them photographed on several occasions between 1999 and 2001. The JI was also exploring the idea of sabotaging the MRT system and Jurong Island. None of these plans against Singapore targets had proceeded beyond reconnaissance to the more serious stages of preparations (e.g. procurement of explosives).




Negatives and photographs developed from them of the water pipeline at the Bukit Timah Nature Reserve found in JI member Ab Wahab Ahmad's (detained in September 2002) possession.

Upon receiving instructions from JI leaders to conduct a reconnaissance of the water pipelines from Malaysia to Singapore, Fiah Ayub members Ab Wahab, Ja'afar Mistooki (detained in January 2002), Syed Ibrahim (detained in September 2002) and Mohammad Aslam (detained in Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance in November 2001) posed as joggers and visited the Bukit Timah Nature Reserve. Ja'afar and Syed Ibrahim then took photographs of the water pipeline at the Nature Reserve while Wahab and Aslam acted as "look-outs".

The Singapore targets surveyed by Singapore
JI members were:

- water pipelines at the Causeway and at Hindhede Road, the PUB Woodlands Water Booster Station, the Bukit Panjang Service Reservoir at Fajar Road and the Bukit Timah Water Works opposite the Kandang Kerbau Women's and Children's Hospital
- Changi Airport and Biggin Hill radar Station
- Mindef Headquarters at Bukit Gombak
- Jurong Island
- MRT stations including the Operations Control Centre
- Ministry of Education HQ at North Buona Vista Drive

In one particular plan, the JI sought to target the Singapore Ministry of Defence (Mindef). A reconnaissance was made of the perimeter and exit points of the Mindef Gombak Complex and the report was recovered in a search of Ab Wahab bin Ahmad's premises. Some time in late 2001, Syed Ibrahim reportedly tailed a Mindef officer from the ministry's Bukit Gombak headquarters all the way to Tampines. Syed Ibrahim had carried out this assignment at the instruction of his *fiah* Ayub senior member Ja'afar Mistooki who was considering placing explosives in a Mindef officer's car and detonating them while the car was within Mindef.



A handwritten and a typewritten report of the reconnaissance of the Ministry of Defence (Mindef). The reports were found in the possession of JI member Ab Wahab Ahmad (detained in September 2002).

On 14 March 2001, Fiah Ayub members Ja'afar Mistooki (detained in January 2002) and Mohammad Aslam (detained in Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance in November 2001) conducted a reconnaissance of the Mindef headquarters at Bukit Gombak. Aslam drove a lorry along Upper Bukit Timah Road and Hillview Avenue while Ja'afar video-filmed the perimeter of the Mindef compound. The reconnaissance report also recorded that they had gone to the 13th floor of Block 11 located at Hillview Avenue for an aerial view of the Mindef compound. Reference was also made to a map that was apparently drawn upon completion of the reconnaissance.

Singapore JI Members – Profile and Motivations

Psychological Profile

Independent teams of psychologists have interviewed the 31 detainees. All except two were assessed to have average or above average intelligence. About one-third had intelligence above the population norm, including two with superior level intelligence. These men fully understood that they were not dabbling in childish play. Certain items among their possessions, including topographical maps with detailed markings (showing observation posts and “kill zones”), hunting knives (for knife-throwing and jungle survival), forged immigration rubber stamps and documents for subterfuge, detection-avoidance and bomb-making, showed that they were deadly serious about their actions. Over a prolonged period, they had systemically conducted reconnaissance of key targets and had repeatedly and consciously accepted instructions from foreigners such as “Sammy”.

These men were not ignorant, destitute or disenfranchised outcasts. All 31 had received secular education (although one later pursued and obtained a degree in Islamic studies at a university in Malaysia). Like many of their counterparts in militant Islamic organisations in the region, they held normal, respectable jobs. (In Malaysia, the Al-Ma’unah, or ‘Brotherhood of Inner Power’, group was able to recruit civil servants, police and military personnel into its ranks. Among KMM and Malaysian JI members were graduates and professionals.)

As a group, most of the detainees regarded religion as their most important personal value. The second highest value they were concerned with was economic, i.e. having material comforts and material wealth. Spiritual and economic values were followed by social values, such as concern for the well-being of others and being good Muslims to help the *ummah* (Muslim community).

Motivations

What motivated the Singaporeans in the JI group? What drove them to plot such

destructive plans, which they knew could injure and kill Singaporeans, including other Muslims? The psychologists found the recruitment techniques used by JI to promote the acceptance of JI ideology and belief systems to be noteworthy.

The first stage of JI recruitment involved religious classes organised for a general mass audience. The potential JI recruit was usually recommended quite innocuously to Singapore JI leader and spiritual advisor Ibrahim Maidin’s classes by their own friends, relatives and colleagues. The majority of JI members were introduced to JI in this way and many continued studying not only because of the search for religious knowledge but also the sense of Muslim fraternity and companionship. The JI teachers would employ the tactic of inserting into lectures quotations from the Quran and Hadith, discussion on *jihād* and the plight of suffering Muslims worldwide.

The second stage of JI’s recruitment involved identifying those who were captivated enough to find out more about the plight of Muslims in other regions such as the Maluku, Bosnia, and Mindanao. Ibrahim Maidin identified potential members from those who were curious enough to remain after classes to enquire further. He engaged these students’ interest and compassion further and finally invited those he deemed suitable to join JI. This recruitment process would usually take about 18 months. The few who were selected as members were further made to feel a strong sense of exclusivity and self-esteem.

The members were taught that anyone who left the group was an infidel. On the other hand, those who remained enjoyed a sense of exclusivity and commitment in being in the in-group of a clandestine organisation. Secrecy, including secrecy over the true knowledge of *jihād*, helped create a sense of sharing and empowerment vis-à-vis outsiders. Esoteric JI language or “JI-speak” was used as part of the indoctrination process. Code names for instance resulted in a strong sense of “in-group” superiority especially since JI members were said to be closer to Allah as they believed in the “truth” (JI doctrine); even Muslims who did not subscribe to militant *jihād* were seen as infidels. This dogmatism convinced many JI

No: _____

I understand my responsibilities and capabilities, and I am prepared for:

Do'a

Da'wah

Contribute ideas ✓

Ifq Sha ✓

Ifq Oth ✓

Actv opr otsd

Sup opr insd

Actv op insd ✓

Istim ✓

Copy of the survey form prepared by Singapore JI leader Ibrahim Maidin (detained in January 2002) following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US and the subsequent US-led campaign in Afghanistan. Ibrahim Maidin issued the survey to a selected number of JI members. The survey was meant to determine the JI members' level of commitment for the cause of supporting the Taleban in Afghanistan. The survey asked if they were willing to give support to "operations" beyond and within Singapore and if they were ready for "istimata" (i.e. sacrifice their lives) in carrying out attacks against US interests. Three JI detainees – Khalim Jaffar, Hashim Abas and Ja'afar Mistooki (all detained in January 2002) – indicated in their survey forms that they were willing to die for the cause.

Do'a -- Offer supplications for the Taleban and the mujahidin
Da'wah -- Missionary
Contribute ideas -- Contribute ideas to help the Taleban
Ifq Oth -- Contribute funds to the Taleban
Ifq Sha -- Donation of New Singapore Shares
Actv opr otsa -- Conduct sabotage outside Singapore against US interests
Sup opr insd -- Support any activity against US interests
Active op insd -- Conduct sabotage inside Singapore against US interests
Istim -- Volunteer to be a suicide bomber against US interests

members that in the course of *jihad*, innocent lives (Muslim or non-Muslim) could be sacrificed.

Mystical manipulation was used to commit its members by having them take the *bai'ah* and pledging their allegiance to the JI leader or *amir*. The pledge was a powerful compliance generating mechanism. Another technique involved psychological contracting. After a fiery speech, for example, when the audience's emotions had been stirred up, Ibrahim Maidin gave out surveys to members to fill up. Members were required to indicate their preferred choice of responsibilities and

capabilities such as contributing ideas or even dying for the cause (*istimata*). Having signed their names on the survey, members were not able to alter their decisions later on. To ensure that members remained committed and did not blow the whistle on JI, leaders employed the social psychological concept of escalation of commitment. Hence, although a few members had misgivings about their reconnaissance missions, they felt they could not withdraw as they were already "in too deep". The JI members were promised martyrdom if they died in cause of *jihad*.

The psychologists concluded that many JI members turned to leaders like Ibrahim Maidin as they wanted a "no fuss" path to heaven. They wanted to be convinced that in JI they had found "true Islam" and free themselves from endless searching as they found it stressful to be critical, evaluative and rational. They believed they could not go wrong, as the JI leaders had quoted from holy texts. The psychological profile of the JI members (e.g. high compliance, low assertiveness, low in the questioning of religious values, and high levels of guilt and loneliness) suggested that the group of JI members was psychologically predisposed to indoctrination and control by the JI leaders and needed a sense of belonging without close attachments. Some were altruistic and wanted to help the *ummah*. Others wanted to accumulate "points" for a place in heaven.

Current Threat Assessment

The persistence of the regional JI network should not be underestimated. After the JI arrests in December 2001, Fathur Rohman managed to order six tonnes of TNT from an illegal supplier in the Philippines. Had he not been arrested by Philippine authorities in January 2002, that TNT might have eventually found its way to Singapore.

Although the detainees in Singapore have expressed varying levels of remorse and regret for their actions, some of them still believe they are duty-bound to respond to the call of *jihād*. Ibrahim Maidin told the Advisory Board in February 2002 that as long as the US was "doing things against Muslims", the JI would continue to attack the US. He also told a senior ISD officer that he had made the mistake of moving too quickly and should have waited for Malaysia, Indonesia and Mindanao to become Islamic states under *syariah* law first before acting against US interests. He believed that this development was inevitable and would also lead to Singapore's absorption into an Islamic state.

Essentially, the 31 detainees saw no contradiction between living in a prosperous and harmonious multi-racial society and serving in a militant group, be it the JI or the

MILF. Although they knew that their actions would harm Singaporeans, they felt that this was an unavoidable price to pay for the advancement of their *jihād*. Singapore JI leaders took this goal so seriously that they actively sought terrorist training for their members in Afghanistan, Mindanao and even Kashmir. To prepare for these stints, Singapore JI leaders would conduct pre-course ideological preparations as well as physical and survival training at several locations in peninsular Malaysia.

ISD's assessment is that with the second batch of arrests and detentions in September 2002, the JI network in Singapore has been severely disrupted. However, the recent bomb attacks in Bali and the Philippines show clearly that the threat of terrorism in this region is far from over. The recent arrests of Al-Qaeda operatives who operated in the region, like Mohd Mansour Jabarah ("Sammy") and Omar Al-Faruq (Al-Qaeda's "sleeper" and operative based in Indonesia) as well as key JI commanders like Imam Samudra (@ Kudamah) and Ali Gufron (@ Mukhlas) would help to deprive the terrorist network of key operatives and leaders and may be helpful in putting the pieces together on JI's plans for attack, its *modus operandi* as well as its extensive linkages and infrastructure in the region.

There is a need for the regional security and intelligence services to continue to work closely to locate and arrest those other key JI leaders on the run including Hambali and Malaysian JI member Azahari Husin. Also on the run is Singapore JI leader Mas Selamat bin Kastari, who along with several Singapore JI members had fled Singapore when the security operations started in December 2001, and remain at large. Mas Selamat is known to have discussed with Hambali and others plans to retaliate against the Singapore Government for the disruption of JI, including a plan to hijack a US, British or Singapore plane and crash it into Changi Airport.

Besides JI, other militant groups in the region may also mount attacks to show their solidarity with JI and to retaliate for the ISD arrests. In fact, the detained JI leader Ibrahim Maidin told

the ISA Advisory Board candidly that the arrests and their attendant publicity have made Singapore a target for militant Islamic groups sympathetic to JI in the region. This is an additional reason to investigate more deeply into groups like the MILF and assess its security threat to Singapore.

The MILF has already in its own right attracted security concern in Singapore. Among the 18 detained in September 2002, 3 had a deep association with the MILF. Husin Aziz, Zulkifli Jaffar and Habibullah Hameed (Zulkifli and Habibullah are both also JI members) had taken the *bai'ah* before MILF chief Hashim Salamat. Besides raising funds and recruiting supporters, Husin and Habibullah had received military training by the MILF, performed sentry duty at Camp Abu Bakar to guard against attacks by the Philippines Army and also helped MILF to purchase materials for making explosives.

In ISD's assessment, any Singaporean who offers direct or active assistance to an organisation like the MILF which engages in terrorist violence (regardless how it rationalises this violence ideologically) is a subject of security concern. In particular, those who participate in the violent activities of such organisations are assessed as demonstrating a dangerous proclivity to resort to violence to pursue or support a political or ideological cause. They pose an active threat to Singapore's national security.

In view of the currency and severity of the threat posed by JI and its affiliates like Al-Qaeda and MILF, it is ISD's assessment that all 31 detainees pose an active threat to Singapore's security and their detention is necessary to neutralise their threat and to allow investigations to continue to ferret out all others in the JI and MILF networks in Singapore.

(IV) ISA ADVISORY BOARD'S REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

First group of 13 Detainees

Under Section 11 of the Internal Security Act (ISA), the ISA Advisory Board must meet within three months of the issue of an Order of Detention to consider a detainee's case. All 13 JI detainees exercised their legal right to make representations, with five making oral representations, three making written representations, and four making oral and written representations. One detainee, Mohd Nazir bin Mohd Uthman, engaged a lawyer, Subhas Anandan of Harry Elias Partnership, to make his representation.¹¹

The ISA Advisory Board, comprising Justice Chao Hick Tin (Chairman), Henry Chan Wah Tim (a businessman) and Dr Chook Kum Kay (a private medical practitioner), met between 25 and 28 February 2002 at Justice Chao's chambers in the Supreme Court to examine all the detainees and hear their representations. In addition, the Advisory Board interviewed senior ISD officers. The Advisory Board also examined all relevant statements and confessions and 56 case exhibits, including video-recordings of targets and seized documents relating to JI and its activities.

The Advisory Board also examined the statements of four witnesses and heard their testimonies directly. Three of them, including the manager of a local company which imports chemicals, testified that JI detainee Ellias Khan had approached them to purchase 17 tonnes of ammonium nitrate. The fourth witness was a foreign expatriate working in Singapore who had witnessed Ellias filming Changi Naval Base from a ferry headed for Seban Cove in Johor, Malaysia. (The witnesses have

requested their names not to be made public as they fear reprisals.)

On 2 April 2002, the Advisory Board submitted its findings and recommendation to the President. The Advisory Board reported that all 13 detainees had admitted to the allegations against them. The detainees had also expressed remorse and regret for their actions, to varying degrees. However, the Advisory Board also observed that many of the detainees tended to downplay their involvement in JI and their awareness of the consequences of their actions, even though the evidence showed otherwise. In their interviews by the Advisory Board, a few detainees continued to feel that they had to respond and oblige if the call for *jihad* were made. They also admitted that they regarded any injury of Singaporeans, including Muslims, as regrettable but unavoidable consequences of *jihad* against the US. Ibrahim Maidin told the Advisory Board that the US had to change its policy towards the Middle East. He said that as long as the US hits Islam, JI would have to attack the US. On the JI arrests, he said that "God did not will the attack to happen and predestination cannot be over-ridden".

Based on all available evidence, the Advisory Board assessed that although all 13 detainees were members of JI, different detainees had different levels of involvement in JI operations. Some of them were ordinary rank-and-file members, while others were either proven and experienced militants or held leadership positions. The Advisory Board concluded that "it is clear that all of them were involved in an elaborate conspiracy, initiated and aided by foreign terrorist groups and with each playing their separate roles here, to gravely undermine the security of Singapore. This plot, if carried out, would certainly have caused loss of lives, physical injury and damage to property. Indeed, considering the huge quantity of ammonium nitrate which they intended to acquire, the consequences would have been catastrophic".

¹¹ Since the issue of the Orders of Detention on 6 January 2002, the detainees have been given weekly access to their families. Nazir was also given regular access to his lawyer. A Board of Inspection, consisting of volunteers from community and civic groups, has also visited the detainees monthly to inquire into their well-being.

The Advisory Board finally noted that "although the bombing of targets in Singapore may have been averted with the arrests, there is still a serious security threat posed by the JI operatives who are on the run. These people have been trained militarily and have the capability and capacity to plan and execute acts of violence. In particular, the detainees had confirmed to the Advisory Board that Mas Selamat, the Singapore JI leader, is assessed to have such a capability".

Second Group of 18 Detainees

Of the 18 detained in September 2002, eight chose to make representations to the Advisory Board. One, Husin Aziz, was represented by counsel P Padman of KS Chia Gurdeep and Param. The Advisory Board sat on 6 and 7 November 2002 at the Supreme Court chambers of Justice Chao and heard the detainees' representations. The Advisory Board also examined all relevant statements, confessions taken before a magistrate and 102 exhibits.

On 5 December 2002, the Advisory Board submitted its findings and recommendations to the President. The Advisory Board's report noted that while all 18 persons had expressed regret for their involvement in the JI and/or MILF, their level of commitment to militant *jihād* when they were involved in JI/MILF was so strong that some like Faiz Abdullah and Ab Wahab were willing to be suicide bombers if instructed to be so by the JI leaders. All 18 had taken the *bai'ah* to JI and/or MILF leaders and were given to understand that breaking such an oath would invoke the outright condemnation of their fellow JI/MILF members and open them up to divine retribution.

The Advisory Board noted that the *bai'ah* operated as a powerful impediment on the detainees in fully revealing all that they knew about JI to ISD as this might compromise those JI/MILF members currently on the run. The Advisory Board was of the view that ISD would need to continue to inquire into those Singaporeans implicated by those JI/MILF members currently under detention and that investigations could only be pursued effectively if there was no obstruction by known JI/MILF members. It noted that several of the 18 detainees had been covering up for the JI/MILF network and obstructing investigations before their own arrests. For example, some had alerted and collaborated with those who had been identified by ISD but not yet interviewed. Salim Marwan, for example, while under investigation himself, was receiving instructions from Singapore JI leader Mas Selamat to urge Singapore JI members and their families to flee.

In view of the currency and severity of threat posed by JI and its partners like Al-Qaeda and the MILF, the Advisory Board concurred with ISD's assessment that "the 18 persons pose an active threat to Singapore's security and that their detention is necessary to neutralise their threat and to allow investigations to continue to ferret out all others in the JI and MILF networks". Having considered all the circumstances and mitigations made, including their expressions of remorse, the Advisory Board agreed with the Order of Detention, for a period of two years in the first instance, made against each of the 18 persons.

See Annex B for a selection of exhibits tendered against the 31 detainees at the ISA Advisory Board

See Annex C for a list of the detainees.

(V) COUNTERING THE TERRORIST THREAT

Although Singapore cannot eliminate terrorism completely and by itself, it can take steps to protect its people and to make it difficult for any terrorist to operate in Singapore undetected. In addition, the lessons learnt from the JI case have placed Singapore in a better position to face the threats that still remain.

(A) Enhancing Security Measures

After 11 September 2001, the Singapore Government stepped up the level of security protection throughout Singapore and has made it a hard target. The Police and the Singapore Armed Forces increased defensive security measures at key installations and buildings which, if sabotaged, could lead to loss of life and undermine investor confidence in Singapore. These key installations include Changi Airport, border checkpoints, important Government and commercial buildings, and oil and water installations. The Police and ISD have also conducted special training for security agencies and in-house guards of key installations, covering emergency response procedures and identification of bombs and weapons.

The Government has also tightened Singapore's border controls. Travellers have been subjected to some inconvenience, but such measures are necessary to prevent the entry of foreign terrorist elements and those who would help them. Customs and Immigration personnel also carry out stringent checks at sea, air and land checkpoints. They have used the best equipment available (including X-ray machines and walk-through metal detectors) to enhance their capabilities while minimising inconvenience. Since October 2001, the Government has also imposed stricter visa requirements on foreign nationals from certain countries.

Border control is recognised as a key line of defence against the current terrorist threat. The Government has announced the formation of a new border control agency called the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (ICA).

The ICA will be formed by April 2003 and will amalgamate the immigration and border control functions of Singapore Immigration and Registration and Customs and Excise Department under a unified command. This will create a seamless policing capability, monitoring and regulating the movement of goods and people across Singapore's borders.

The Government also recognises that many terrorist activities worldwide are funded by money-laundering operations. As such, Singapore signed the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism in December 2001. In July 2002, Parliament passed legislative measures to give effect to the Convention and to criminalise terrorist funding. Within and outside the Government, new arrangements to enhance inter-organisation information exchange and co-operation have been established. While Singapore has so far not detected any terrorist-linked accounts in our financial system, stringent checks will continue.

Even before the events of September 2001, the Government was aware of the emergence of bio-chemical terrorism and cyber-terrorism as potent new forms of terrorism. As such, the Government has carried out research into these new threats in order to develop capabilities to deal with them. In November 2002, Parliament passed the Strategic Goods (Control) Act to regulate the movement of strategic goods which include munitions and dual-use material which could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction, i.e. bio-chemical and nuclear weapons. The Government has also developed new methods to defend Singapore's national information technology infrastructure and is drawing up a new framework to manage info-communication emergencies.

The Government recognises that it cannot defend Singapore from terrorism by acting alone. Al-Qaeda's international character and the intricate web of militant Islamic organisations in the region mean that countries

must work together to defeat terrorism. Such co-operation has long been a hallmark of intelligence and security agencies in and beyond the region, but has expanded rapidly in recent months. For example, Singapore has given access to officials from the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, US and Australia to interview the JI detainees. Singapore's intelligence and security agencies remain committed to information exchanges and will pursue avenues for greater co-operation so as to remain one step ahead of the terrorists.

(B) Policing the Spread of Terrorist and Extremist Ideology

Enhanced security and intelligence are not enough to solve the problem. For a broad-based approach to the problem, the Government needs to enlist the co-operation of the Muslim community and the wider community of all Singaporeans.

Unlike the Communists of the past who were recruited through an external or cold process, JI recruited its members through an internal process from within the Muslim community. Through open and legitimate religious activities, JI leaders spotted potential members and used their positions of religious authority and knowledge to manipulate their recruits. Gradually, these leaders nudged their students into extremism and the clandestine world of JI. In doing so, they exploited the trust and respect that members of the Muslim community traditionally accord to religious teachers and scholars.

Foreign Muslim terrorists also exploited the deeply-felt sense of Islamic brotherhood among Muslims. This sense of brotherhood, which often transcends ethnicity and national boundaries, facilitates transnational co-operation between various radical and extremist groups. These self-proclaimed Muslim terrorists may therefore pose a greater challenge than the communist terrorists of the past, who faced difficulties working with each other because of their ethnic and nationalistic differences. (For example, Malayan communists would probably not have entrusted their lives to Indonesian or Vietnamese communists.)

To address the threat from organisations like JI, we need to understand their distinctive characteristics. ISD's investigations into JI have revealed the following important features:

- JI's radical brand of Islam and its violent conception of *jihad* came from **foreign religious teachers** such as Bashir, Abu Jibril and Hambali.
- After their induction into JI, JI members **stayed away from mainstream religious activities** and kept to themselves. Keeping together as a closely-knit group reinforced the ideological purity of the group and kept them loyal to the teachings of their foreign teachers.
- There was a strict **code of secrecy** and key members took **oaths of personal allegiance** to JI's overall leader.
- To avoid detection, the leaders **used overseas sites** in Malaysia, Indonesia, Mindanao and Afghanistan for training and for sensitive and important meetings.

The Government recognises that in its efforts to identify and neutralise radical teachers and foreign terrorist operatives, it must not disrupt the legitimate practices and peaceful activities of the local Muslim community. With the support of the Government, the Muslim community will need to propose and implement measures to prevent dangerous foreign influences, such as the distorted teachings of foreign preachers like Bashir and Abu Jibril, from infiltrating Singapore and influencing Muslims here.

For a start, the Muslim community must develop a comprehensive, self-regulatory system to monitor religious education. Such a system will help the Muslim community to detect dangerous extremist teachings, especially those from abroad, before they take root here. All Singaporeans, and not just Muslims, must exercise vigilance against extremist religious teachings and suspicious or clandestine activities. If Singaporeans encounter people whom they know or strongly

suspect to be involved in such activities, they should also notify the authorities.

(C) Strengthening Social Cohesion and Religious Harmony

The terrorist threat affects all of us, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. Groups such as JI can undermine the inter-ethnic peace and harmony that we have enjoyed over the years. The 11 September 2001 attacks in the US, and the subsequent JI arrests, have aroused concerns among Singaporeans. Some Muslims worry that these developments have caused non-Muslims to view them with distrust and suspicion. On the other hand, some non-Muslims have expressed concern over what they perceive as increasing radicalism within the Muslim community. These divisive misgivings and suspicions must be addressed and checked.

The vast majority of Singaporean Muslims are moderate, tolerant and law-abiding, and do not support the actions of the Muslim militants. Although the local Muslim community has shown a trend of increasing religiosity, it does not support violence and terrorism. Muslim community and religious leaders have come out strongly and unequivocally to condemn the 11 September 2001 attacks and JI. Singaporeans must remember that the members of JI were a small and isolated group of misguided Muslims with no support from the community. It would be tragic if the terrorist attacks and the JI case caused distrust and suspicion between Singaporeans.

At Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong's dialogue with community leaders on 28 January 2002, he expressed concern about inter-racial and inter-religious relations at the ground level:

"At the leadership level, I am confident that good sense will prevail when dealing with racial and religious incidents. Reactions will be calm, considered and based on facts. People on the ground, however, tend to react emotionally based on rumours, hearsay and prejudices. Their reactions could well be irrational and from the gut. A minor incident could blow up into a major confrontation between the races and religions. We must prevent this."

To prevent this, the Prime Minister directed the People's Association to set up Inter-Racial Confidence Circles (IRCC) and Harmony Circles at community levels, schools and work places to promote better inter-racial and inter-religious understanding between the different communities, and

"to provide a platform for confidence-building among the different communities, as a basis for developing, in time, deeper friendships and trust. Regular interactions will build up inter-racial and inter-religious rapport. They will also provide opportunities for all parties to address immediately racial and religious problems on the ground".

If Singaporeans of all races and religions build for themselves a more cohesive and tolerant society, groups such as JI will find it much harder to establish a foothold in Singapore. To-date, 84 IRCCs have been successfully formed in all constituencies.

Following the second round of JI arrests, the Prime Minister convened another dialogue with community leaders on 14 October 2002. Reiterating his concern that the JI arrests should not cause fault lines to develop in inter-racial and inter-religious relations in Singapore, the Prime Minister proposed a Code on Religious Harmony¹². Such a code can be a framework to guide all religious groups, and will help to crystallise the consensus of Singaporeans of all races and religions about the way we should conduct ourselves as we pursue our respective religious beliefs in multi-racial Singapore.

¹² A tentative formulation offered by PM for discussion and debate was - "We the citizens of Singapore, acknowledging that we are a secular society; enjoying the freedom to practice our own religion; and recognising that religious harmony is a cornerstone of our peace, progress and prosperity; hereby resolve to practise our religion in a manner that: promotes the cohesion and integration of our society; expands the common space of Singaporeans; encourages mutual tolerance, understanding, respect, confidence and trust; fosters stronger bonds across religious communities; and prevents religion from ever being a source of conflict".

CONCLUSION

Because of the globalisation of terrorism, as well as the political and security situation in South East Asia, Singapore, like all countries in the world, will face the threat of terrorism by radical and militant groups claiming to operate in the name of Islam for some time to come. Singaporeans of all religious faiths must be on their guard against religious extremism. The Government has taken and will continue to take necessary preventive and defensive measures to protect lives and property in Singapore, but there are no foolproof measures that can insulate us completely from a threat that all countries in the world face today.

Much is at stake for a multi-racial and multi-religious country like Singapore. Terrorism in the name of a religion will cause enormous harm to inter-religious and inter-racial ties. Unlike material loss, such damage to Singapore's social fabric will take many years to heal. Singaporeans will build up their psychological strength, and be better

prepared to weather any future terrorist attacks perpetrated in the name of religion, if they practise mutual tolerance, respect and moderation as a matter of course every day. When these attitudes prevail, they should ensure that terrorism will not triumph in Singapore.

In 1989, the Government published a White Paper on the Maintenance of Religious Harmony. The White Paper pointed out:

“Two vital conditions must . . . be observed to maintain harmony. Firstly, followers of the different religions must exercise moderation and tolerance, and do nothing to cause religious enmity or hatred. Secondly, religion and politics must be kept rigorously separated.”

Given the nature of the terrorist threat that we face, these fundamental conditions for Singapore's well-being remain relevant and valid today.

Annexes

SUMMARY OF CASE AGAINST JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH (SINGAPORE)

Chronology of Investigations and Developments

The first specific lead that the Internal Security Department (ISD) received which led to the operation against the clandestine organisation known as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) came from a Singaporean. Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, the Singaporean provided information that **Mohammad Aslam bin Yar Ali Khan** (Aslam), a Singaporean of Pakistani extraction, had claimed to know Al-Qaeda's leader Osama bin Laden (Osama) and to have fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan.

ISD then began to watch Aslam and his associates. On 4 October 2001, Aslam left Singapore suddenly on a flight to Pakistan (it was later discovered he was bound for Afghanistan). Between 13 October 2001 and 16 October 2001, Aslam's close friend **Mohamed Elias s/o Mohamed Khan** (Elias) was observed to be in close contact with several foreigners (later identified to be foreign terrorist elements "Mike" and "Sammy"). In mid-October 2001, Elias was observed to be actively trying to procure ammonium nitrate. He also converted US\$3,500 into local currency (this was later discovered to be payment for the reconnaissance of the US and Israeli Embassies and other locations).

On 3 December 2001, the media published a report about Aslam following his arrest by the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. As the story was likely to attract further media attention, ISD decided to bring forward its operation against Aslam's associates before they went underground or left the country to escape arrest.

ISD's operation began on 8 December 2001. On 9 December 2001, ISD detained the first group of 6 persons and searched their houses and offices. Further arrests were made on 15, 16 and 17 December 2001. The last person was located and arrested on 24 December 2001. A total of 23 persons were picked up for questioning.

On 14 December 2001, five days after the first JI arrests, the US authorities informed ISD about a videotape of the Yishun Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) station found in Afghanistan. ISD received a copy of the said videotape and debriefing notes on 28 December 2001.

13 of the 23 questioned were subsequently confirmed to be active members of the JI and members or supporters of operations cells within the organisation. All 13 were involved in profiling and surveillance of targets for terrorist attacks and in the procurement of logistics including transport, hiding places and materials for bomb construction. The principal terrorist targets profiled were US official and civilian establishments including Sembawang Wharf, the US Embassy, American Club and commercial buildings housing US entities and areas where US military personnel were sighted, such as the vicinity of Yishun MRT station. JI members of these operations cells produced observation reports and video-recordings of the reconnaissance conducted and submitted them to the foreign terrorists who directed and funded the development of plans for terrorist attacks in Singapore.

Investigation into the JI continued and through discreet investigation, ISD positively identified more persons who are or were members of the clandestine network. In September 2002, 18 more persons were detained under the ISA. Of the 18, 17 were confirmed to be or have been members of the JI, while one of them was an MILF member. At least 8 of JI members detained in September 2002 conducted reconnaissance and surveillance of strategic targets in Singapore, such as water pipelines and Changi Airport.

Principal Terrorist Plans

Singapore JI members were involved in at least six different plans to attack US and other assets in Singapore. The details are below.

Plan 1 – Plan to Mount Multiple Truck-Bombs Against US-related Targets

This was the most developed and determined plan by the Singapore JI group. This plan was scheduled to be effected against multiple targets in Singapore in December 2001/January 2002 or April/May 2002. In late September 2001, the Malaysian JI leader **Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana** (Faiz) contacted the Singapore cell named *Fiah* Musa through his brother **Fathi Abu Bakar Bafana** (Fathi) (a member of the cell) to assist a foreign friend code-named "Mike". The latter subsequently met with *Fiah* Musa members Ellias, **Adnan bin Musa** (Adnan) and **Mohamed Nazir Mohmmmed Uthman** (Nazir) and instructed them to assist an Al-Qaeda operative code-named "Sammy" in a terrorist plan.

"Sammy" arrived in Singapore from Kuala Lumpur in October 2001 and, as arranged, he was met by *Fiah* Musa members Adnan, Nazir, Ellias and Fathi. "Sammy"'s plan was to use truck-bombs to attack the US Embassy, the Israeli Embassy and the US naval bases in Singapore. He met *Fiah* Musa members near a hotel in the Newton area and he briefed them on his plan in Adnan's car at a carpark in Marina South. He asked *Fiah* Musa members Adnan, Ellias and Nazir for suggestions on other possible targets. They identified the Australian and British High Commissions as targets because of their proximity to the US Embassy. They also explored "soft" targets and identified several commercial buildings in the city housing American companies which could be potential targets.

Adnan, Ellias and Nazir brought "Sammy" and "Mike" around to conduct reconnaissance of the selected sites. They video-recorded these sites and downloaded it into a video compact disk (VCD) which Fathi subsequently titled "Visiting Singapore Sightseeing" to disguise its contents. A copy of the VCD was later conveyed by "Mike" to "Sammy" in Kuala Lumpur. (ISD found a copy of the VCD in a search of Fathi's office on 9 December 2001.) In addition, "Mike" tasked Ellias to obtain 17 tonnes of ammonium nitrate (AN); the JI in Malaysia had in its possession four tonnes of AN¹ and a quantity of TNT which

¹ The location of these four tonnes of AN were reportedly in Muar under the custody of one "Sabah". The Malaysian

were obtained earlier but not used. (The AN was to be a substitute for the chemical TNT in the making of explosives as the Singapore JI members felt it was difficult to obtain TNT in Singapore or Malaysia. Nevertheless, while Ellias would source for AN, "Mike" continued to source for TNT.²) In addition, Ellias and his cell members were tasked to conduct reconnaissance of the naval bases used by the American military in Singapore and to look for suitable warehouses where the rigging of the bombs to the trucks could be done without detection. "Mike" gave Ellias a total of US\$5,500 in two cash payments to cover expenses incurred in their preparations.

The terrorist plan was to rig up six truck bombs, each with three tonnes of AN and to simultaneously attack six locations in Singapore. (The truck bomb which brought down the World Trade Centre building in Oklahoma City in 1995 was rigged with two to three tonnes of AN.) The local cell would conduct the reconnaissance, set up the logistics and, when all was ready, "Sammy"³ would bring his own people down to Singapore to rig the bombs at the secured warehouse. The trucks would then be driven and parked at designated points near the targets. (For instance, for the US Embassy target, the truck was to be parked at the Taman Serasi carpark.) The local cell members would then leave the country as unknown suicide bombers arrive. These suicide bombers (believed to be Arabs) would be brought down to

authorities subsequently disclosed that the AN had been shipped to Batam.

² "Mike" managed to find an illegal supplier in the Philippines. He ordered six tonnes of TNT and bought 1.2 tonnes first as he did not have sufficient funds. After taking delivery of the 1.2 tonnes of TNT, he was about to leave for Kuala Lumpur via Bangkok to meet up with JI leaders to obtain the money to pay for the remaining 4.8 tonnes when he was arrested by the Philippines authorities. (ISD discovered that he was using the Philippines identity of "Alih Randy" and conveyed this to the Philippines authorities.)

³ ISD has been informed that "Sammy" had also been arrested and is under US custody. "Sammy" is identified as Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, a Canadian-Arab. So far, Mohammed Mansour has revealed that he was the liaison person between Al-Qaeda and the Southeast Asian operatives. He revealed that Hambali had briefed him in Karachi, Pakistan, on operations planned on targets in the Philippines. He also corroborated that he was in Singapore for the reconnaissance of the US assets with the help of the Singapore JI members.

Singapore just a day before the planned attack. They would be shown the route and their vehicle. They would then proceed to operate individually and mount the attack on their assigned target between 8.00 a.m. and 10.00 a.m. the following morning.

Eventually, Ellias located a friend who could procure the AN required. The friend knew a contact who worked as a despatch clerk for a company which imported chemicals, including AN. The clerk approached his manager and was told to direct Ellias to see him to place the order directly. However, ISD arrested Ellias before he could follow up to make the purchase. (The friend Ellias approached as well as the despatch clerk and the manager were interviewed by ISD and found not to be involved with the JI. Their statements were submitted to the ISA Advisory Board which also interviewed them directly.)

The arrest of the *Fiah* Musa members⁴ as well as the other key members of the local JI network disrupted the terrorist plan to bomb targets in Singapore. However, it did not put an end to the plan. On 13 December 2001, Hambali met with Singapore and Malaysia JI members in Johor, Malaysia. He urged them to persist with the bombing plans to demonstrate that they could still mount the attacks (albeit on a smaller scale) as well as to retaliate for the ISD arrests. The Singapore JI members were not confident of doing so; several decided to flee Singapore. Nevertheless, the regional JI leadership continued to pursue the plan. Hence, Fathur Rohman @ "Mike" went ahead to order six tonnes of TNT, paid for a first installment of 1.2 tonnes and was seeking to pick up funds from JI leaders in Malaysia to procure the remaining 4.8 tonnes. The explosives were to be smuggled by sea from Mindanao to Manado (Indonesia) and then Malaysia and finally via the Causeway to Singapore. Had Fathur Rohman not been arrested in January 2002, the plan would have been pursued and developed to fruition.⁵

⁴ *Fiah* Musa members (Adnan, Ellias, Fathi and Nazir) were four of the six persons arrested by ISD on 9 December 2001. The rest, with the exception of Hashim bin Abas, were arrested between 15 and 17 December 2001. Hashim was arrested on 24 December 2001.

⁵ ISD believed from investigations that "Mike" could have possessed a Philippines passport and informed the Philippines authorities accordingly. The Philippines took action and has since identified and arrested "Mike" in January

Plan 2 - Plan to Attack US Personnel in Shuttle-Bus at Yishun MRT Station

Initiated by *Fiah* Ayub leader **Mohamed Khalim bin Jaffar** (Khalim) himself, the plan was for an attack against a shuttle-bus service which conveyed American personnel and families in the Sembawang area to the Yishun Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) station. Together with *Fiah* Ayub member, **Hashim bin Abas** (Hashim), Khalim conducted several surveys and video-recordings of the site. They then patiently pieced together a composite video and Hashim provided the commentary in English.⁶ Also present at the editing of the tape were *Fiah* Ayub member, **Ja'afar bin Mistooki** (Ja'afar) and Singapore JI leader, **Mas Selamat bin Kastari** (currently at large).

Sometime in 1997, Khalim conceived the idea of attacking US personnel at the Yishun MRT station. He knew that US military personnel would usually shuttle between the Yishun MRT station and their naval facilities in Sembawang Wharf. Sometime in 1999, Khalim, Ja'afar and Hashim were instructed by an Indonesian religious teacher in Johor to plan sabotage actions against American interests in Singapore. Khalim, Ja'afar and Hashim then discussed and identified several areas of interest for possible targeting and these included routes taken by

2002. "Mike" is an Indonesian whose real name is Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi. Fathur is a bomb-maker and terrorist trained by the MILF. He was involved in the bombing of a Light Railway Train in Manila in December 2000 which killed 22 persons. Fathur's capture also led to the discovery of 1.2 tonnes of TNT, 300 pieces of detonators, as well as six rolls of detonating cords. Fathur revealed that the explosives were meant for Singapore.

⁶ The JI "casing" (reconnaissance) methodology included a reliance on video recordings of the targeted sites as preparation. Such video reconnaissance and recordings were conducted over many times and a final composite video would then be produced for use to finalise the operation. A total of five videotapes/VCDs were found by ISD in searches of the homes of those arrested. This included the original master copy of the Yishun MRT station reconnaissance videotape (which was discovered in Khalim's flat on 21 Jan 2002) found by the American forces in the home of Al-Qaeda's Abu Hafs in Kabul. The Americans briefed ISD about the video on 14 Dec 2001 when ISD briefed them about the JI arrests (which began on 9 Dec and ended on 24 Dec 2001). At ISD's request, the Americans gave a copy of the videotape found in Afghanistan to ISD on 28 Dec 2001.

shuttle buses ferrying US personnel and families from Pakistan Road to the Yishun MRT Station.⁷

Of the targets discussed, an attack against American military personnel in the vicinity of the Yishun MRT station became the most developed plan. Khalim, together with Hashim and other cell members, discussed and executed their plans to conduct reconnaissance of the routes taken by the US personnel as well as the vicinity around the Yishun MRT station. Khalim drew up maps of the station while Hashim used a video-camera to film the station and its surroundings, paying special attention to specific areas where explosives could be placed. Hashim brought along with him his children to the Yishun MRT station area to disguise his intentions while Khalim acted as the look-out. Hashim later edited a videotape of the reconnaissance and recorded a commentary in English to explain the visuals seen on the video-tape. Present during this editing process were Khalim, Ja'afar and Singapore JI leader Mas Selamat.

At Hambali's instruction, Faiz went to Afghanistan and conveyed this videotape of the reconnaissance of the vicinity of Yishun MRT station to Al-Qaeda member Mohamed Atef @ Abu Hafs, one of Osama's lieutenants, sometime in 1999. After viewing the videotape, Abu Hafs instructed Faiz to procure the explosives and to short-list men to execute the attack. Faiz conveyed Abu Hafs' instructions to Hambali upon return to Kuala Lumpur. Later, in 1999, Khalim was invited to meet with Al-Qaeda leaders, including Abu Hafs, while he was in Afghanistan on training. He briefed the Al-Qaeda leaders (in English because they did not speak Malay and Khalim's command of Arabic was limited) and provided notes and diagrams of the location of Yishun MRT station to explain his plan. Although the Al-Qaeda leadership showed interest in the plan, for reasons unknown, it was not subsequently pursued.⁸

⁷ Also found among Khalim and Hashim's possession was a computer document of a list of over 200 American companies. The plan was to identify prominent members of the American community in Singapore for attack. Khalim mentioned that he had discussed with other JI members his plan to kidnap or assassinate these persons.

⁸ Faiz believed that due to difficulty in obtaining the required amount of explosives (two tonnes of TNT), the operation was subsequently aborted.

The video-tape of the reconnaissance of the vicinity of Yishun MRT station was subsequently found among the rubble of the home of Abu Hafs in Afghanistan following the US counter-strikes. Also found were four pieces of notes made on Yishun MRT station. One showed the rough location of Yishun in Singapore. The second piece was a rough sketch of the surroundings of the station. The third piece was a more detailed map where the streets surrounding the MRT station were marked out. The fourth piece was a note in Arabic containing general information about Singapore and its road systems, including information that the shuttle bus carrying US military personnel would arrive at the station at 15-minute intervals. Khalim said he had made the sketches and had dictated the note to one of Osama's men while he (Khalim) was in Afghanistan.⁹

Plan 3 – Plan to Attack US Naval Vessels and Personnel

A fairly well developed plan by *Fiah Ayub* was an attack against US naval vessels off Changi and Pulau Tekong. One of the items found in *Fiah Ayub* leader Khalim's possession was a topographical map with markings indicative of targeting and operational planning. Analysis of the markings indicated that detailed planning had been made for a sea-borne bomb attack using a small vessel against US ships travelling eastwards from Sembawang Wharf via Pulau Tekong. The markings identified a strategic "kill" zone where the channel was narrowest and where the ship would have had no room to avoid a collision with a suicide vessel. It also took advantage of the geography of the areas to hide the

⁹ On 21 January 2002, ISD found the original videotape of the vicinity of Yishun MRT station hidden at the bottom of a cabinet in Khalim's residence. This original videotape contained images of Hashim's family whom he had brought along for the reconnaissance to deflect attention and suspicion. Hashim said that the original version of the recording of Yishun MRT station was stored in the video camcorder. Sometime in 1999 and 2000, Khalim, Mas Selamat, Ja'afar and Hashim viewed the video and edited it so that shots of Hashim's family were taken out. Hashim also narrated a commentary in English to accompany the visuals in the video; English was used because the Al-Qaeda leaders did not understand Malay and Hashim and Khalim were not proficient in Arabic. This edited version was recorded later onto a regular video-tape and conveyed to Afghanistan by Faiz and subsequently found by the US in Afghanistan.

attack vessel from radar and visual detection until the very last minute. Investigation showed that the JI members had been exploring such an attack and had monitored the route and patrol schedule of the Police Coast Guard in the area from a location across the Straits in Johor. JI members also revealed that they observed the naval vessels at Sembawang Wharf from a restaurant in Johor across the Straits.

Apparently, these plans which were made sometime from around the mid-1990s were not pursued as the Singapore JI members lacked the operational capability to mount such an attack. As in the case of the other significant plans, the Singapore JI members saw their role as supportive of actions to be mounted by foreign terrorists. The Singaporeans provided the "leg-work" while the foreign elements would mount the actual attack.

In early 2001, these plans were re-visited when two unidentified Middle-Easterners approached Faiz for information on US military vessels in Singapore. Faiz then instructed members of another operations cell *Fiah* Musa to survey both Sembawang Wharf and Changi Naval Base. They video-recorded what they observed and a copy of the video was later given to the Middle-Easterners in Kuala Lumpur.

In November 2001, Ellias on his own initiative conducted a reconnaissance of Changi Naval Base and video-recorded what he observed. He did this while taking the ferry from Tanah Merah Ferry Terminal to Seban Cove (Johor) in November 2001. (ISD found a copy of the video in a search of *Fiah* Musa member Nazir's possessions.) Ellias' conduct on board the ferry attracted the attention of a foreign expatriate working in Singapore. He found Ellias' behaviour suspicious as he was so engrossed in video-recording the naval ships at the Changi naval base. The expatriate subsequently identified Ellias through media photos when the JI operation was publicised. He volunteered a statement to the ISD and was also interviewed by the ISA Advisory Board.

Plan 4 – Plan to Attack US Assets/Personnel at Paya Lebar Airbase

On the instruction of Khalim conveyed through *Fiah* Musa members Ellias and Nazir, JI

member **Andrew Gerard** (Gerard) took over 50 photographs of Paya Lebar Airbase where he worked as a technician with Singapore Technology Aerospace Systems (STAS). These photographs, which were taken by Gerard using his office's digital camera in early 2001, were meant to support JI's plan for a potential terrorist attack against US aircrafts. Khalim, however, was unhappy with the photographs as they were taken outside the secure area (where the US presence was). He wanted access to the secure area and urged the JI members in *Fiah* Musa to look for someone with such access e.g. a security guard. This was still the plan at the time of the JI arrests. (The photographs of the airbase were found by ISD among Khalim's possessions.)

Plan 5 – Attack Against US School and US/Israeli Companies

Operations cell *Fiah* Ismail was activated only after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. **Halim bin Hussain** (Halim), a member of this cell, had previously experienced combat action in the Maluku, Indonesia, during his stint there in 2000. Halim and three other *Fiah* Ismail members, including the leader, met a few times between November and December 2001 where they were instructed by the cell leader to conduct reconnaissance of the Singapore American School (SAS) and US and Israeli companies. They were told to mark out observation posts, monitor movement of US security personnel and take photographs and photocopy maps of the buildings of interest for targeting. Halim was instructed to buy a camera and to take the required pictures. The *Fiah* Ismail leader had stressed that all film processing and photocopying should be done in Johor Bahru, Malaysia, to avoid detection. *Fiah* Ismail ceased all activity when they heard of the arrests of the other JI cell members in December 2001.

Plan 6 – Attack Against Local Installations

The JI also considered Singapore targets for attack. Hambali was keen to create chaos by carrying out attacks in such a way that they implicated Malaysia. His plan was to create enough chaos and animosity between Singapore and Malaysia to provoke war. JI could then take advantage of the instability to

overthrow the secular governments of Singapore and Malaysia and establish an Islamic state.


The potential targets considered by JI in Singapore included several water works and water pipelines (including those at the Causeway), Changi Airport and the radar station at Biggin Hill which were surveyed on several occasions between 1999 and 2001, and the Ministry of Education building at North Buona Vista Drive. The JI was also exploring the idea

of sabotaging the Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) system including the Operations Control Centre, and Jurong Island.

In one particular plan, JI was interested to target the Singapore Ministry of Defence (Mindef). Sometime in late 2001, *Fiah* Ayub member **Syed Ibrahim** tailed a Mindef officer from the Ministry's Bukit Gombak headquarters all the way to Tampines. Syed Ibrahim had carried out this assignment at the instruction of his *Fiah* Ayub senior member Ja'afar Mistooki who was considering placing explosives in a Mindef officer's car and detonating them while the car was within Mindef.

None of these plans against Singapore targets had proceeded beyond reconnaissance to the more serious stages of preparations (e.g. procurement of explosives).

Selection of Exhibits Tendered to the ISA Advisory Board



Photograph of a JI "Recall and Operational Exercise" schedule found in JI member Simon Sabtu (detained in September 2002)'s possession.

The period for the exercise was from 5-7 May 2001, during the Vesak Day weekend. According to the schedule, the JI Fiah involved in the exercise were "Musa", "Ayub", "Yakub", "Daud/Nuh/Isk" and "Syuib". Each Fiah was to be activated between 2000 hrs and 2230 hrs. After meeting at a designated place (usually a member's house or a mosque), they would then proceed to various "Operation" locations in Malaysia and Singapore with their outdoor and communication equipment to conduct either field training or surveillance activities.

According to Simon, the schedule was given to him by Khalim Jaffar (detained in January 2002) sometime in May 2001. Khalim had instructed Simon to conduct a 2-day field training for Fiah Musa members in Johor to teach them abseiling, compass navigation and trekking.

IT forensic investigations uncovered 3 letters addressed to Taleban chief Mullah Mohammed Omar and one to Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden from Singapore JI leader Ibrahim Maidin (detained in January 2002)'s computer hard disk and diskettes. Ibrahim Maidin had revealed that JI's objective was an Islamic Indonesia and that JI's idea of Daulah Islamiyah had expanded to include other nations in the region. Ibrahim Maidin considered Afghanistan to already be a successful Islamic state and wished to be part of this success. According to Ibrahim Maidin, he decided to write these letters to Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders after his proposal for JI to join the Taleban was rejected by the syura. Generally, Ibrahim Maidin's letters posed questions on Mullah Omar's leadership and if the latter should be regarded as the Caliph of Muslims. Ibrahim Maidin also asked, in his letters whether Muslims should migrate to Afghanistan to join the Taliban. Significantly, in one of his letters to Mullah Omar, Ibrahim Maidin disclosed that some of "our brothers were prepared to extend their assistance to the cause of Islam". In this letter, Ibrahim Maidin informed that he would be sending \$1,000 as a contribution.

Following pages show 2 copies of his letters and their translations.

<p style="text-align: center;">P</p> <p>من إبراهيم محيي الدين السنغافوري إلى الشيخ ملا عمر أيداه الله وحفظه 4 جمادى الأولى 1420 16 August 1999</p> <p>السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته. الحمد لله والصلاة والسلام على رسول الله وعلى آله وصحبه ومن والاه. نسأل الله الخير والسلامة لنا ولكم ولأهل الإيمان أجمعين. يسعدني أن أخبركم بأن بعض إخواننا يخوضون في بعض أمور لنصرة الإسلام والمسلمين. ولكي نشاركوا في العمل والأجر إن شاء الله نستعين بالله ثم نستمددكم أن تُرسلوا إلينا بعض الحوائج الذي لا نشك أنه في ما استطعتم إرساله. قد وضحنا الأمر للأخ محمد قاسم حفظه الله لكي يبلغكم لياها شفويا. وعن طريق محمد قاسم أيضا نؤدي إليكم ألف دولار سنغافوري، من بعض أموال الزكاة التي قد جمعنا ههنا. اللهم خذ العيون والأخبار عن اليهود والنصارى والمشركين. والله المستعان وعليه توكلنا وعليه فليتوكل المتوكلون.</p> <p>و السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته. أخوكم في الله</p> <p>..... إبراهيم محيي الدين السنغافوري</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Translation</u></p> <p>From: Ibrahim Maidin of Singapore To: Mullah Omar Dated: 16 Aug 1999 (4 Jamadil Ula 1420H)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">I am glad to inform you that some of our brothers (members?) are ready to extend their help for the cause of Islam and the Muslims.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">I am also forwarding to you, through Mohamed Kassim, a sum of \$1,000 as our contribution from our zakat (tithe) collections.</p>
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P

من إبراهيم محيي الدين السنغافوري
إلى الشيخ ملا عمر أبده الله وحفظه
28 محرم 1421 هـ
3 May 2000

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته. الحمد لله والصلاة والسلام على
رسول الله و على آله وصحبه ومن والاه. نسأل الله الخير والسلامة
لنا ولكم ولأهل الإيمان أجمعين.

قد أشكل علينا بعض الأمور في أفغانستان فنريد أن نستفسركم فيها:

- أ- علم المسلمون في هذا العصر بأنك قد لقيت بأمير المؤمنين
في أفغانستان.
هل بهذا اللقب صرت خليفة في الأرض يعني خليفة شرعياً
للمسلمين أجمعين ؟
- ب- هل يجب على جميع المسلمين في أنحاء العالم أن يقبلوا
خلافتك ويأبوعوك للإمامة ؟

ج- هل يجب على جميع المسلمين الذين في بلاد الكفر أن يهاجروا
إليك أم بعضهم فقط ؟ وما هي طريقتها ؟ هل يترك المسلم كل ما
لديه من أهل ومال وشؤون في بلده ويلحق بكم ؟ فلو كان الأمر
بالهجرة لجميع المسلمين فماذا سيكون حال المساجد والمعاهد
الإسلامية والشؤون الإسلامية الأخرى التي تحت رعاية المسلمين
في بلادهم ؟ وإذا كان لبعضهم فقط فمن هؤلاء البعض ؟ وماذا
يفعل المسلم العائش في بلاد الكافرين إذا لم يقدر على الهجرة إليكم
سواء كان لعذر شرعي أم بلا عذر شرعي ؟

- د- وماذا يفعل المسلم الذي يعيش في بلاد المسلمين وليس فيها
حكم

الإسلام وكيف يعامل المسلمون فيها وحكامها بعد أن بايعك بعض
المسلمين للإمامة ؟ وماذا يفعل المسلم الذي يعيش في المملكة
العربية السعودية وكيف يعامل المسلمون فيها وحكامها بعد أن بايعك
للإمامة ؟

هـ- وماذا موقف علماء الأمة وخاصة علماء مسلمي العرب في
عصرنا عن أمركم هذا ؟

و- وهل صحيح أن معظم علماء الحجاز لا يعطون ولاهم لك
لأنكم تعتقدون ببعض عقائد المشاعرة أو الماتريدية خاصة في
تأويلات بعض أسماء الله تعالى وصفاته وأيضا أنكم تحكمون دولتكم
على مذهب أبي حنيفة رحمه الله، و هم يعتقدون أن عقائد المشاعرة
والماتريدية ليست بعقائد أهل السنة والجماعة على منهج السلف
الصالح وكذلك نسمع من علماء الحرمين أنهم لا يفضلون الحكم في
جميع الأمور الشرعية بمذهب معين واحد فقط ؟

ز- وهل صحيح أنكم ستطلبون أن تكون أفغانستان عضوا من
الأمم المتحدة ؟ وهل يجوز في شريعتنا لدولة إسلامية أن تكون
عضوا من الأمم المتحدة ؟

ح- هل صحيح أنه لا يجوز على الأمة عزل ملك السعودية الذي
يوالي أمريكا وأعدائها من الكفار في أمور كثيرة، ولزم عليهم
إطاعته والصبر على ما يوالي الكفار ؟

ط- وما الحكم للذين ما زالوا يشكون في أمر أفغانستان لكثرة
الدعوات التي ما تزال منتشرة بين المسلمين ؟

إن كنت لست بخليفة شرعي للأمة، إذن أشدك الله أن تدعو كبار
علماء المسلمين اليوم أن يجتمعوا إليكم لينتخبوا خليفة شرعياً
للمسلمين. نحن نظن أن هذا الأمر من أهم الأمور بعد أن مكك الله
أرض أفغانستان و أعطاكم شوكة و أعوانا من المؤمنين. نرجو أن
لا تنتظروا سقوط أحمد شاه مسعود لأن انتخاب الخليفة للمسلمين

نضع يمينه وبنسى بنحار من ان ينصروا سقوط احمد شاه مسعود او
أمورا أخرى.

أفيدونا بقاوى صحيحة وسليمة في هذه الأمور حتى لا نأثم عند لقاء
الله عز وجل يوم القيامة. فننتظر منكم الجواب الشافي كتابية في
أقرب وقت ممكن إن شاء الله للعنوان المذكور التالي أو الأفضل عن
طريق الذي أتاك هذه الرسالة.

والله نسأل التوفيق والسداد لنا ولكم، والسلام عليكم ورحمة الله
وبركاته.

أخوكم في الله

.....
إبراهيم محيي الدين السنغافوري
M.C.S.T. 270
The Belmont
1 Belmont Road
Singapore 269852

1-23

Translation

From: Ibrahim Maidin of Singapore
M.C.S.T. 270
The Belmont
1 Belmont Road
Singapore 269852

To: Mullah Omar

Dated: 3 May 2000 (28 Muharam 1421H)

I would like to seek your clarifications, among other things, on the following matters:

- Now that you have been given the title of the Emir of the faithful in Afghanistan, does this mean that you have now become the Caliph of all Muslims.
- Is it compulsory upon Muslims in non-Muslim countries to migrate to Afghanistan? In what way can they do so. If all the Muslims are required to migrate, what would happen to the mosques, Islamic institutions and other Islamic affairs in their countries. If only some of them are required to migrate, who are these people.
- How about Muslims who live in Muslim countries that are not governed by Islamic law, and those in Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia.
- How does the Muslim *ulamak* (scholars/theologians), especially the Arab *ulamak*, view this matter.
- Is it true that the majority of the *ulamak* from Hejaz (Arab countries on the west coast of the Red Sea) do not concur with you.
- Is it true that you will request for Afghanistan to be allowed to join the United Nations?

- Is it true that the Saudi King/authority is an American ally and co-operates with the non-believers in many matters? In this connection, do Muslims still have to obey him and be patient with the non-believers?

I hope that the Muslim *ulamak* will support you in electing a leader for the Muslims. I also hope that Ahmad Shah Mas'oud will be brought down.

Please reply to my queries immediately.

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yipewrjew
Security of an organisation

What the enemy wants?
Penetrations - disunite - betrayal - diversion - take control, -
dissolve.

What should you protect not to reveal?
Organisation - Avoid revealing the existance, number of members
, target, movement.
Structure - links, personels in the organisations and positions

Personel - involved in the organisation position and operations

Document - any document you received, you use (even receipt, in
voice, pamphlet that link to your
operation)
Logistic - movements, links and supplies.
Territories - countries involved or visited.
Avoid mentioning or showing interest on personel, places, or an
y links.

Home
Avoid giving residential no to members.
Avoid giving pp no to family members including wife, friends at
working place.
Avoid using cordless phone.
Do not inform family members of your destination, what you have
eaten, what you have been doing.


Make your move irregular. - going out and returning, the routes
, clothes.
Prepaid should be on all the time.
Keeping secret doc. in safe boxes.

Meeting Place
Set one personel meeting point in advance (shopping ctr, coffee
shop, public place)
Avoid cameras on buildings, petrol/train stations, roads.....

Set reason for meeting before leaving.
Set phone communication system (comm. code)
Change meeting point from time to time.
Park vehicle away from meeting place.
Avoid using Public telephone near your -home, work place, hotel

Page 1

IT forensic investigations uncovered a 12-page document entitled "Security of An Organisation" from Fiah Ayub member Khalim Jaffar (detained in January 2002)'s computer hard disk. The document lists the various security measures JI members can take to avoid detection by the authorities. Following page shows the first page of the document. Terrorist groups like the Al-Qaeda are known to have produced similar manuals which advise on the kind of actions members can take to avoid detection and protect themselves.



Handwritten notes on bomb-making. The notes, which are on the use of chemical compounds in the construction of explosives, were found in Fiah Ayub member Khalim Jaffar (detained in January 2002)'s possession. Hashim Abas (detained in January 2002) made these notes when Khalim and he attended a bomb-making course in Malaysia in 2000 conducted by "Mike" (@ Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi).

Following pages show the first two pages of a letter found in Fiah Ayub member Khalim Jaffar (detained in January 2002)'s diskette and their translation. The letter was written by another Fiah Ayub member Hashim Abas (detained in January 2002) to the "Qoid Mantiqi" (district chief) who is believed to be Hambali, the Indonesian JI leader currently at large. In this letter, Hashim recommended four JI members for military training, citing their strengths and qualities. Among others, Hashim recommended one "Nasir" (Fiah Musa member Nazir Uthman; detained in January 2002) for training as an assassin since he was a bachelor. Hashim also asked the "Mantiqi" to write letters of reference for the four JI members to undergo training at a madrasah in Pakistan. This madrasah education was in fact a cover for JI members to journey to Pakistan and thereon to the training camps in Afghanistan. This letter from the madrasah was to be sent to Singapore's Ministry of Defence for the JI members' applications for exit permits to leave Singapore for Pakistan.

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Kepada Qo'id Manthiqi
 Dari Aminul Am Wakalah Umar Bin Al-Khattab (ra)

Seperti yang telah anda mengetahui, bahawa ke empat-empat ikhwan yang sampai kepada anda adalah untuk di kirimkan ke tempat yang jauh untuk tadrīb. Di sini ana ingin meminta agar anda dapat menuliskan surat mengenai mereka supaya pihak di sana dapat memenuhi keperluan kita di sini.
 Bio-data ikhwan-ikhwan ini telah pun di kirimkan kepada anda.

1. **Nasir (Hameed)**
 Siap untuk istimewa sekiranya pihak di sana memerlukannya. Sekiranya tidak, kami ingin agar beliau di berikan latihan2 yang khusus selepas tadrīb asasnya.

- a. Sniper.
- b. Field Engineering.
- c. Assassin.

Nasir adalah seorang bujang yang lebih baik penerimaannya dengan praktikal daripada teori. Beliau boleh teruskan latihan kerana tiada ketetapan masa. Dan kami di sini belum punya ikhwan yang terlatih sebagai komandan. Beliau perlu mengirimi surat kepada ibunya dari negeri jauh supaya ibunya tidak tercari-cari.

2. **Ilyas (Deedat)**
 Beliau juga seorang bujang yang tidak memberikan ketetapan masa. Jika boleh, beliau dapat di berikan latihan2 yang sama dengan Nasir.
3. **Rafi (Yusuf)**
 Beliau juga seorang bujang tapi telah menetapkan masa hanya 6 bulan sahaja untuk tadrīb.
4. **Hassan (Zaid)**
 Beliau telah berumah-tangga dan mempunyai anak. Selesai latihan tadrībnya, jika beliau setuju, boleh di lanjutkan dengan daurah Syar'iah dan Qiyadah. Beliau ada potensi yang baik untuk di sertakan ke dalam Majlis Qiyadah di samping kemampuan beliau untuk menerima pelajaran-pelajaran.

5. Surat Resmi

Seorang ikhwan memerlukan surat resmi dari madrasah di Pakistan dan di kirim dari sana juga sebagai bukti keasliannya. Surat itu adalah untuk tujuan menyewakan rumah supaya beliau dapat membiaya keluarganya ketika beliau menjalani latihan tadrīb. Juga untuk memohon "Exit Permit" dari MINDEF kerana akan keluar negeri lebih dari 6 bulan.

Yang penting adalah surat itu mempunyai "Letter Head" madrasah di sana. Isinya hanyalah penerimaan ikhwan itu untuk belajar di madrasah itu dan ikhwan itu boleh mulakan kuliah apabila sudah mendaftarkan diri di madrasah itu. Sebaik-baiknya dalam tulisan bahasa Arab.

Contoh surat itu :

Kepada Saudara
 Hashim Bin Abas
 Blk 442, Fajar Road
 Singapore 670442

1. Ingin kami maklumkan bahawa permohonan anda untuk menjadi penuntut madrasah ini dalam jurusan Syar'iah telah di luluskan.
2. Akan tetapi, anda perlu menghadiri kelas Bahasa Arab terlebih dahulu yang juga di adakan di madrasah ini.
3. Anda boleh mulakan kuliah sebaik saja anda sudah mendaftarkan diri di madrasah ini.
4. Terima kasih

Mudir
 Madrasah

Mudah-mudahan dengan surat itu, urusan ana di sini akan menjadi lebih mudah
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Translation

To Qoid Manthiqi
From Aminul Am Wakalah Umar Bin Al-Khattab (ra)

As you have been informed, the four members sent to you are to be sent to a far away place for *tadrib*. Please write a reference letter for them so that the party there can meet our needs here. Their biodata have already been sent to you.

1. Nasir (Hameed)
Ready for *istimata* should the party over there needed him. If not, we would like him to undergo a specialist training after attending the basic *tadrib*.
 - a. Sniper
 - b. Field Engineering
 - c. Assassin

Nasir is a bachelor who is good at practical than theory. He can continue with the training as he has the time. We do not have members who are trained commandos here. However, he needs to write to his mother from a distant country so that she would not look for him.
2. Ilyas (Deedat)
He is also a bachelor who has the time to spend. If possible, please give him the same training as Nasir.
3. Rafi (Yusu)
He is also a bachelor but can spend only 6 months for the *tadrib*.
4. Hassan (Zaid)
He is married and has children. After the *tadrib* session, if he is agreeable, he can continue with the *Syar'iah* and *Qiyadah dawrah*. He has the potential to be included in the *Majlis Qiyadah*, and has the ability to absorb knowledge.
5. Official letter
A member needs an official letter from a madrasah in Pakistan. The letter is to be sent from there as a proof of authenticity. It is for the purpose of renting out his house so that he could pay for his family expenses during his *tadrib* session. It is also to be used for applying an "Exit Permit" from MINDEF as he will be out of the country for more than 6 months.

Most importantly, the letter must have a "Letter Head" of a madrasah from there. The content should mention that the said member has been accepted for study in the madrasah, and that he can start attending classes after he has made the registration. It would be better if it is written in Arabic.

Sample letter:

To
Mr Hashim Bin Abas
Blk 442, Fajar Road
Singapore 670442


1. Please be informed that your application to study in this madrasah in the field of *Syar'iah* has been accepted.
2. However, prior to that you will have to attend an Arabic language class which is also held in the madrasah.
3. You can start attending your class once you have made the registration with the madrasah.
4. Thank you.

Principal
Madrasah

Hopefully, this letter will help to facilitate my work here.

Following pages show a letter JI member Mohd Jauhari Abdullah (detained in September 2002) wrote to the wives of JI fugitives as well as the JI members arrested in December 2001. In the letter, Jauhari told the wives that the recent events were a test from God and that they should strengthen their faith. He claimed that the JI detainees and those at large were in the right since they had been chosen by God to carry out dakwah (missionary work) and wage jihad against non-Muslims.

Jauhari also harboured hopes to bring the remaining JI members into his jihad group. He proposed to Salim Marwan (detained in September 2002) to hold meetings with the remaining JI members so as to sustain their jihad spirit. Meanwhile, Jauhari also sent letters promising help to the wives of arrested JI members. He encouraged them to support their husbands' actions and remain steadfast in the jihad cause.



Kami harap para Ikhwan dan Akhawat semua tetap bersabar dalam mengharungi kehidupan seharian dan banyak mendekatkan diri kepada Allah, serta sentiasa berdoa akan keselamatan dan kejayaan kita seluruhnya.

Yakinlah akan pertolongan Allah dan pembukaan (kemenangan) yang semakin hampir. Insyallah.

Sekian,

Dari Ikhwanmu,

Mohd Jauhari bin Abdullah (SHAFIE).
Bumi Allah
Singapura
16 Zulhijjah 1422
1 March 2002.

Translation (Full)

In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful

To all brothers and sisters who are always in the care of Allah.

Praise be to Allah who has showered us with His numerous blessings and who has shown us the straight way that we will achieve success and strength, Insyallah (if Allah wills it). Peace be to Prophet Muhammad, his companions, the *tabi'in* (Muslims who had met the companions of Prophet Muhammad) and those who follow him until the Last Day.

My brothers and sisters, please understand that the recent incident is but a test from Allah. Probably, it has, more or less, challenged our patience, faith, confidence and principles in upholding Allah's religion.

Hence, as your fellow brother, I urge you to patiently persevere, strengthen your faith and devotion to Allah and to hold on steadfastly to the responsibilities entrusted upon us. As stated in surah Al Baqarah (2 : 155): "Be sure we (Allah) shall test you with something of fear and hunger, some loss in goods or lives or the fruits (of your toil), but give glad tidings to those who patiently persevere" and in surah Ali Imran (3 : 103): "And hold fast, all together, by the rope which Allah (stretches out for you), and be not divided among yourselves".

Keep in mind Prophet Muhammad's reminder for us to hold on steadfastly to the teachings of the Quran and *Sunnah* when slander, misunderstanding and major challenges abound then.

Your husbands are on the right path. Allah had chosen them among the millions of people to carry out *dakwah* (missionary activities) and jihad against the infidels and to wipe out infidelity. Victory is guaranteed for them, Insyallah. This is stated in surah Al Maidah (5 : 56): "The fellowship of Allah that must certainly triumph" and in surah Al Saffat (37 : 173): "And that Our forces - They surely must conquer."

Rest assured that your difficulties are ours as well. We can feel what you are feeling right now. We are also looking into helping the families of our fellow brethren affected by the recent incident (especially in terms of financial assistance and their children's education). We will try to help as best as we could, Insyallah.

We hope all brothers and sisters will remain patient in leading this life daily, as well as strive to be closer to Allah always and to constantly pray for our safety and success.

Believe in Allah's help and the victory that is coming our way, Insyallah.

From your fellow brother

Mohd Jauhari bin Abdullah (SHAFIE)
Bumi Allah (Allah's Earth)
Singapore
16 Zuhijjah 1422
1 Mar 2002

LIST OF DETAINEES

First Group of 13 Detainees

S/N	Name
1	<p>Haji Ibrahim bin Haji Maidin</p> <p>Nationality: Singaporean Age: 52 Race: Indian Religion: Islam Occupation: Condominium Manager Education: 3 "O" Levels NS Record: Served NS part-time in Police Special Constabulary; exempted from Reservist</p>
2	<p>Mohamad Anuar bin Margono</p> <p>Nationality: Singaporean Age: 32 Race: Malay Religion: Islam Occupation: Chauffeur Education: 4 "O" Level Passes NS Record: Served full-time NS in Police (L/Cpl). Placed under disruption list since 1992.</p>
3	<p>Mohamed Khalim bin Jaffar</p> <p>Nationality: Singaporean Age: 40 Race: Javanese Religion: Islam Occupation: Printer Education: NTC2 in Offset Printing NS Record: Exempted from full-time NS.</p>
4	<p>Ja'afar bin Mistooki</p> <p>Nationality: Singaporean Age: 41 Race: Boyanese Religion: Islam Occupation: Freelance Despatch Driver Education: NTC3 and 2 in Plumbing & Pipe-fitting NS Record: Exempted from full-time NS.</p>

S/N	Name
5	<p>Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana</p> <p>Nationality: Malaysian Age: 40 Race: Malay Religion: Islam Occupation: Businessman/contractor Education: Polytechnic Diploma in Civil Engineering NS Record: Exempted from full-time NS.</p>
6	<p>Fathi Abu Bakar Bafana</p> <p>Nationality: Singaporean Age: 37 Race: Malay Religion: Islam Occupation: Business Owner/Director Education: NTC2 in Precision Machining NS Record: Served full-time NS in SAF (L/Cpl). Still on Reservist.</p>
7	<p>Mohamed Ellias s/o Mohamed Khan</p> <p>Nationality: Singaporean Age: 30 Race: Indian Religion: Islam Occupation: Manager Education: 2 "O" Level Passes NS Record: Served full-time NS in SAF (L/Cpl). Still on Reservist.</p>
8	<p>Mohamed Nazir bin Mohmmed Uthman</p> <p>Nationality: Singaporean Age: 28 Race: Indian Religion: Islam Occupation: Ship Traffic Assistant Education: NTC2 in Motor Vehicle Mechanic NS Record: Served full-time NS in SCDF (Cpl). Still on Reservist.</p>

S/N	Name
9	<p>Adnan bin Musa</p> <p>Nationality: Singaporean Age: 37 Race: Malay Religion: Islam Occupation: Civil Engineering Technician Education: NTC2 in Motor Mechanic NS Record: Served full-time NS in SAF (L/Cpl). Still on Reservist.</p>
10	<p>Halim bin Hussain</p> <p>Nationality: Singaporean Age: 42 Race: Malay Religion: Islam Occupation: Supervisor Education: 2 "O" Level Passes NS Record: Served full-time NS in Police (Constable). Completed Reserve liabilities.</p>
11	<p>Hashim bin Abas</p> <p>Nationality: Singaporean Age: 41 Race: Malay Religion: Islam Occupation: Service Engineer Education: Polytechnic Diploma in Electrical Engineering NS Record: Served full-time NS in SAF (L/Cpl). Completed Reserve liabilities.</p>
12	<p>Andrew Gerard @ Ali Ridhaa bin Abdullah</p> <p>Nationality: Singaporean Age: 35 Race: Indian Religion: Christianity (converted to Islam in 1988) Occupation: Technician Education: NTC3 in Motor Vehicle Mechanic NS Record: Served full-time NS in SAF (L/Cpl). Reservist in SCDF.</p>

No.	Name
13	<p>Othman bin Mohamed</p> <p>Nationality: Singaporean Age: 43 Race: Malayalee Religion: Islam Occupation: Blaster painting Supervisor Education: 4 "O" Levels NS Record: Exempted from full-time NS.</p>

Second Group of 18 Detainees

No.	Name
1.	<p>Ab Wahab bin Ahmad</p> <p>Nationality: Singaporean Age: 42 Race: Indian Religion: Islam Occupation: Delivery Man Education: Primary Education NS Record: Exempted from full-time NS.</p>
2.	<p>Syed Ibrahim</p> <p>Nationality: Singaporean Age: 30 Race: Indian Religion: Islam Occupation: Despatch Clerk Education: GCE 'N' Level NS Record: Exempted from full-time NS.</p>
3.	<p>Simon bin Sabtu</p> <p>Nationality: Singaporean Age: 38 Race: Malay Religion: Islam Occupation: Canteen Operator Assistant/Proprietor Education: NTC 3 (Metal Machining) NS Record: Served full-time NS in SAF (L/Cpl). Still on Reservist.</p>

SN	Name
4.	<p>Mohamed Noor bin Sulaimi</p> <p>Nationality: Singaporean Age: 32 Race: Boyanese Religion: Islam Occupation: Project Co-ordinator Education: NTC 3 (Motor Vehicle Mechanic) NS Record: Served full-time NS in SCDF (L/Cpl). Still on Reservist.</p>
5.	<p>Munain bin Turru</p> <p>Nationality: Singaporean Age: 41 Race: Javanese Religion: Islam Occupation: Driver Education: NTC 3 (Electrical & Aircon) NS Record: Exempted from full-time NS.</p>
6.	<p>Naharudin bin Sabtu</p> <p>Nationality: Singaporean Age: 33 Race: Malay Religion: Islam Occupation: Part-time Trainer Education: Secondary 5 NS Record: Served full-time NS in SAF (Pte 1st Class). Reservist in SCDF (former SCDF regular). Still on Reservist.</p>
7.	<p>Sanin bin Riffin</p> <p>Nationality: Singaporean Age: 40 Race: Boyanese Religion: Islam Occupation: Driver Education: NTC 3 (General Welding) NS Record: Served full-time NS in Police (VC). Reservist in SCDF. Completed Reserve liabilities.</p>

S/N	Name
8.	<p>Nordin bin Parman</p> <p>Nationality: Singaporean Age: 39 Race: Javanese Religion: Islam Occupation: Taxi Driver Education: Secondary 2 NS Record: Served full-time NS in SAF (L/Cpl). Reservist in SCDF. Still on Reservist.</p>
9.	<p>Mohd Jauhari bin Abdullah</p> <p>Nationality: Singaporean Age: 37 Race: Malay Religion: Islam Occupation: Assistant Engineer Education: Diploma (Electrical Engineering) NS Record: Served full-time NS in SAF (Cpl). Still on Reservist.</p>
10.	<p>Salim bin Marwan</p> <p>Nationality: Singaporean Age: 31 Race: Boyanese Religion: Islam Occupation: Butcher Education: Diploma (Computer Information Technology) NS Record: Served full-time NS in SAF (Cpl). Still on Reservist.</p>
11.	<p>Mahfuh bin Haji Halimi</p> <p>Nationality: Singapore Age: 40 Race: Javanese Religion: Islam Occupation: Manager Education: Bachelor of Islamic Studies (Honours 1st Class) NS Record: Served as Regular (2nd Sgt). Completed Reserve liabilities</p>

S/N	Name
12.	<p>Azman bin Jalani</p> <p>Nationality: Singaporean Age: 39 Race: Malay Religion: Islam Occupation: Unemployed Education: NTC 3 (Maintenance Fitting) NS Record: Served full-time NS in SAF (L/Cpl). Reservist in SCDF. Still on Reservist.</p>
13.	<p>Abdul Majid s/o Niaz Mohamed</p> <p>Nationality: Singaporean Age: 40 Race: Pakistani Religion: Islam Occupation: Driver Education: NTC 3 (General Welding) NS Record: Served full-time NS in SAF (L/Cpl). Reservist in SCDF. Still on Reservist.</p>
14.	<p>Said bin Ismail</p> <p>Nationality: Singaporean Age: 45 Race: Malay Religion: Islam Occupation: Fitter Education: Primary 6 NS Record: Exempted from full-time NS.</p>
15.	<p>Faiz Abdullah Ashible</p> <p>Nationality: Singaporean Age: 37 Race: Arab Religion: Islam Occupation: Unemployed Education: Diploma (Electrical Engineering) NS Record: Served full-time NS in SAF (L/Cpl). Still on Reservist.</p>

S/N	Name
16.	<p>Zulkifli bin Mohamed Jaffar</p> <p>Nationality: Singaporean Age: 42 Race: Malay Religion: Islam Occupation: Used Car Salesman Education: NTC 3 (Sheet & Metal Fabrication) NS Record: Served full-time NS in SAF (Pte). Completed Reserve liabilities.</p>
17.	<p>Habibullah s/o Hameed</p> <p>Nationality: Singaporean Age: 45 Race: Indian Religion: Islam Occupation: Part-time Foot Reflexologist and Religious Teacher Education: Primary 5 NS Record: Exempted from full-time NS.</p>
18.	<p>Husin bin Ab Aziz</p> <p>Nationality: Singaporean Age: 52 Race: Malay Religion: Islam Occupation: Businessman Education: Secondary 1 NS Record: Exempted from full-time NS.</p>

