Issuance of Orders under Internal Security Act (ISA) against Two Self-Radicalised Singaporean Youths, and Updates on ISA Orders

In February and March 2025, two self-radicalised Singaporean youths, aged 15 and 17, were issued with a Restriction Order (RO)¹ and an Order of Detention (OD) under the Internal Security Act (ISA) respectively.  

2.            The 15-year-old female student was a supporter of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).  She aspired to marry an ISIS fighter and was willing to fight for the group in Syria.  She is the first female youth to be dealt with under the ISA².  The 17-year-old male was an online contact of 18-year-old Singaporean Nick Lee Xing Qiu (Lee), who was detained under the ISA in December 2024³. The 17-year-old had been radicalised by violent far-right extremist and racist ideologies and had taken steps in preparation for attacks against Muslims at mosques in Singapore.

 

3.            The youth’s path to radicalisation started in June 2023 after she encountered ISIS propaganda online.  Within weeks of consuming ISIS propaganda, she became convinced that the group was a legitimate religious army defending Muslims in Iraq and Syria.  She viewed ISIS’s goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate as noble, and supported their use of violence to “cleanse the world of kuffar (disbelievers)”, whom she identified as non-Muslims and Shi’ite Muslims. 

4.            The youth also aspired to support the ISIS cause by marrying an ISIS fighter in Syria.  She hoped to start a pro-ISIS family, and raise sons who would become mujahideen (fighters).  After learning that it was necessary to take a bai’ah (pledge of allegiance) to ISIS before she could marry an ISIS fighter, she took a virtual bai’ah to an ISIS chatbot in July 2023, pledging allegiance to ISIS’s former caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.  She saw herself as an ISIS member thereafter.

5.            Between September 2023 and April 2024, the youth searched for flights from Singapore to Syria on three occasions, and considered saving money to fund her travel to Syria.  In addition, she intended to tap on her online network of ISIS supporters for travel advice. 

6.            The youth sought romantic online relationships with overseas-based ISIS supporters.  She frequently reposted ISIS propaganda on her social media accounts to attract other ISIS supporters into communicating and pursuing a romantic relationship with her.  Between July 2023 and December 2024, she was in at least eight short-term romantic online relationships with overseas-based ISIS supporters, including an alleged ISIS fighter based in Syria. 

7.            While the youth’s priority was to marry an ISIS fighter and raise a pro-ISIS family, she was also willing to become a female mujahideen to fight for ISIS in Syria.  Influenced by footage of female ISIS fighters online, she hoped to die a martyr.  She thought that she could travel to Syria and receive weapons training from ISIS once she was there. 

8.            The youth actively reposted extremist materials, including ISIS nasheeds (chants), on her social media accounts to display her support for ISIS.  She also admitted to sharing ISIS-related content with some of her schoolmates.  None of her schoolmates took the materials seriously, and no one reported the extremist materials to their teachers.       

9.            ISD’s investigation to date indicates that the youth had acted alone and was unsuccessful in radicalising her schoolmates.  The youth’s mother was aware that her daughter was consuming pro-ISIS materials and had advised her against doing so.  However, the youth’s mother did not think the youth’s behaviour warranted further intervention. 

 

10.         The 17-year-old was identified during ISD’s investigations of Lee as an online contact of Lee.  The duo had exchanged Islamophobic and far-right extremist materials on social media.  They were self-radicalised separately, had not met in person, and were unaware of each other’s plans to conduct attacks in Singapore. 

11.         The youth’s radicalisation began in 2022, when he encountered Islamophobic and far-right extremist materials online.  His exposure to the materials, coupled with his pre-existing racist views against Malays, led him to develop an aversion towards Islam and Malays/Muslims.  The youth regularly reposted Islamophobic and far-right extremist materials on his social media accounts to incite hatred against Muslims.  He also deliberately engaged in online discussions with Muslims, to criticise Islam.  Similar to Lee, he identified as an “East Asian Supremacist”, believing that Han Chinese, Korean and Japanese ethnicities were superior to Malays and Indians.  

12.         In November 2023, he came across an edited Christchurch shooting video on social media, and searched online for the full livestreamed video, as well as information on the shooter, Brenton Tarrant (Tarrant).  He felt a “sense of satisfaction” from watching Muslims being shot on Tarrant’s video, and saw Tarrant as a “hero” for killing Muslims.  Having consumed online manifestos of Tarrant and other far-right terrorists like Stephan Balliet and Payton Gendron, the youth learnt about the “Great Replacement”,⁴  and became convinced that it was happening in Singapore.  He posted online that there should be individuals like Tarrant in Singapore to shoot Malays and Muslims to prevent them from replacing Chinese as the dominant race.  By early 2024, he had thoughts of emulating Tarrant and shooting Muslims at mosques in Singapore with an AK-47 assault rifle.  Influenced by anti-Semitic content online, the youth also fantasised about killing Jews⁵ but did not have any concrete attack plans to this end. 

13.         The youth planned to use firearms for his attacks at local mosques to maximise casualties.  To this end, he made multiple unsuccessful attempts to procure a gun.  Between February and April 2024, he reached out to a US-based online contact who claimed to be a gun maker.  The contact told him that it would be difficult to smuggle gun parts into Singapore, and suggested 3D printing the gun parts and ammunition instead.  However, the youth did not follow through with the idea due to the cost and technical feasibility.  Separately, the youth also reached out to a foreign contact with the intention to purchase and smuggle a Glock 19 pistol into Singapore, but the transaction did not materialise.  In addition, he enquired about the purchase of a replica pistol from an online seller, with the intention of modifying it into a functional firearm.  However, he did not follow through with the purchase when the seller requested a deposit.  The youth also considered buying guns and ammunition in Malaysia or Thailand, and smuggling them into Singapore by land.  To ensure that he would be able to handle a gun, he watched online videos on handling firearms and planned to visit a shooting range in the US. 

14.         In June 2024, the youth shortlisted five mosques – Masjid Maarof, Masjid Jamek Queenstown, Masjid Darussalam, Masjid An-Nur, and Masjid Hajjah Fatimah – as potential targets for his attacks⁶. While he wanted to conduct attacks against all five mosques to achieve a high “kill count”, he had given greater thought to attacking Masjid Maarof, as he frequented the Jurong West area.  To maximise the number of casualties, he planned to conduct his attacks when Muslims were leaving the mosque after Friday prayers.  He set a target of killing at least 100 Muslims, to outdo Tarrant and other far-right shooters in casualty numbers.  He wanted his attacks to inspire other like-minded Singaporeans into undertaking violence, and planned to livestream his attacks to emulate Tarrant.  He intended to kill himself after conducting his attacks, before the arrival of the police.  At the point of arrest, the youth admitted that he had yet to execute his attacks only because he was unable to procure a gun. 

15.         While the youth had not shared his attack plans with anyone for fear of being arrested, his parents were aware of his hatred towards Muslims and the excessive amount of time that he was spending online.  His father had shared news reports of previous far-right extremist cases dealt with under the ISA, to encourage his son to change his mindset.  However, the youth’s parents did not seek help from the authorities. 

 

16.         Both cases highlight the persistent threat of youth radicalisation in Singapore.  Since 2015, ISD has dealt with 17 youths aged 20 and below under the ISA.  All were self-radicalised online.  Of these 17, nine aspired to carry out attacks in Singapore.  Those radicalised are getting younger, with the 15-year-old being the first female youth and the second youngest, to be issued with an ISA order⁷.   Her case mirrors a global trend of female teenagers, some as young as 14, who aspired to travel to Syria to fight, or to support the ISIS cause by becoming “jihadi brides” (the wives of ISIS militants).  The threat posed by ISIS has not abated, sustained through its online propaganda efforts, virtual network of supporters, and global affiliates. 

17.         Far-right extremism is also finding resonance among Singaporean youths.  The 17-year-old is the fourth Singaporean youth to be dealt with under the ISA since December 2020 for subscribing to far-right extremist ideologies⁸. Extremist materials from far-right terrorists, in particular Tarrant, and his online manifesto, had influenced all four youths.  ISD has been working closely with other Government agencies and community partners to intensify counter-radicalisation outreach to schools and the general public on the threat posed by far-right extremism.  This includes highlighting the prevalence of non-white participation in far-right movements and the key tenets of far-right extremist ideologies, and familiarising the public with signs and symbols which have been misappropriated by far-right extremists.

 

18.         Self-radicalisation can happen very quickly.  In the case of the 15-year-old, it only took weeks.  It is thus critical that the public be vigilant to signs that someone around us may have become radicalised, and quickly seek help from the authorities.  In both cases, the youths had separately shared their extremist views and/or materials with family members and friends, yet none of the family members had sought help for them. 

19.         Family members and friends are best placed to notice changes in behaviour and quickly alert the authorities if they suspect their loved ones have been radicalised.  Doing so allows the suspected radicalised individual to get the help they need, and keeps society safe.

20.         Possible signs of radicalisation include, but are not limited to, the following:

21.         Anyone who knows or suspects that a person has been radicalised should promptly contact the ISD Counter-Terrorism Centre hotline 1800-2626-473 (1800-2626-ISD).

 

22.         Singaporean Mohamed Kazali bin Salleh (Kazali), aged 54, was released from detention on a Suspension Direction (SD)⁹  under the ISA in February 2025.  Kazali, a self-radicalised ISIS supporter, was detained in January 2019.  Following a parallel terrorism financing investigation by the Commercial Affairs Department, Kazali was sentenced to three years and 10 months’ imprisonment under the Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act in September 2021 for providing money to Syria-based Malaysian ISIS militant Wan Mohd Aquil bin Wan Zainal Abidin @ Akel Zainal to facilitate terrorist acts.  Kazali was re-detained under the ISA in February 2024 upon the completion of his imprisonment term as he was assessed to remain vulnerable to re-radicalisation.  He was released on a SD as he had made good progress in his rehabilitation and was assessed to no longer pose a security threat requiring preventive detention. 

23.         The ROs issued against two Singaporeans were allowed to lapse upon their expiry:

a)            The RO issued against Dickson Yeo (Yeo), aged 44, was allowed to lapse upon expiry in January 2025.  He was detained in January 2021 for acting as a paid agent of a foreign state.  He was subsequently released on a SD in December 2021 and issued with a RO in January 2023.  The threat posed by Yeo as a foreign agent has been effectively neutralised and he no longer requires close supervision under the RO regime.

b)            The RO issued against Asyrani bin Hussaini (Asyrani), aged 35, was allowed to lapse upon expiry in March 2025.  Asyrani, who was self-radicalised, was detained in March 2013 after he attempted to engage in the armed insurgency in southern Thailand.  He was released from detention in March 2019 and issued with a RO.  He has made good progress in his rehabilitation and no longer requires close supervision under the RO regime.

 

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¹  A person issued with a RO must abide by several conditions and restrictions.  For example, the individual is not permitted to change his or her residence or employment, or travel out of Singapore, without the approval of Director ISD.  The individual also cannot access the Internet or social media, issue public statements, address public meetings or print, distribute, contribute to any publication, hold office in, or be a member of any organisation, association or group, without the approval of Director ISD.

²  Prior to this youth, ISD had dealt with eight female Singaporean adults under the ISA for terrorism-related activities, with ages ranging from 22 to 61.  Six were self-radicalised, while the other two were found to be in contact with terrorism-linked entities and assessed to be vulnerable to adverse influence and recruitment by terrorist elements.  Three of them were detained, while the other five were issued with ROs.  Currently, three remain on ROs (excluding this youth).   

³  Lee, then a student, was radicalised by violent far-right extremist ideologies.  He had identified as an East Asian supremacist and aspired to conduct attacks against Malays and Muslims in Singapore. 

⁴  The Great Replacement Theory is an ethno-nationalist theory by French anti-immigration author Renaud Camus that posits that white European populations are being replaced by non-Europeans through migration and demographic trends.  Tarrant drew heavily on this theory in his manifesto, which he titled “The Great Replacement”.

⁵  The youth was inspired by far-right terrorist Stephan Balliet’s attack on the Halle Synagogue in Germany in October 2019 which killed two.

⁶  He chose Masjid Maarof and Masjid Jamek Queenstown as he passed by them regularly.  The other three were surfaced through online searches of mosques he perceived to be popular amongst Muslims.

⁷  The youngest person to be dealt with under the ISA is a 14-year-old who aspired to fight for the Black Flag Army and considered carrying out attacks in Singapore.  He was issued with a RO in June 2024.  Prior to this, another 15-year-old, a self-radicalised male ISIS and Al-Qaeda supporter, was detained under the ISA in December 2022.  He had considered conducting attacks in Singapore and harboured the desire to establish an Islamic caliphate through violent means.  The youth remains in detention.    

⁸  The first three cases were: (a) a then-16-year-old who was detained in December 2020 for making plans to attack Muslims at two mosques on 15 March 2021, the second anniversary of Tarrant’s Christchurch attacks.  He was released from detention in January 2024 and is currently on a RO; (b) a then-16-year-old who was issued with a RO in November 2023.  He identified as a white supremacist and aspired to conduct attacks overseas in furtherance of the white supremacist cause; and (c) Lee who was detained in December 2024.

⁹  A SD is a Ministerial direction to suspend the operation of an existing OD.  The Minister for Home Affairs may revoke the SD and the individual will be re-detained, if he or she does not comply with any of the conditions stipulated in the SD.  The SD conditions are similar to RO conditions.