1. Mr Speaker, I thank Members for their support for the Bill and their suggestions.
2. They raised important questions which I will now address.
Scope of Bill
3. First, on the scope of the Bill.
Scope of RO
4. Ms Ng Ling Ling asked if the Restriction Order could be expanded to include other entities such as cryptocurrency exchanges, remittance companies and e-wallet providers, should scammers shift their tactics to exploit these platforms.
5. The MHA recognises there is a risk that such entities can also serve as intermediaries in the scam chain. However, as a start, we will impose restrictions only on bank accounts and credit facilities, which would address a significant number of scam cases and reduce the risk of fund flows to scammers. We will continue to work with the MAS to monitor the scams situation, and consider expanding the scope of the Restriction Order in future, if necessary.
6. Mr Neil Parekh asked about the criteria and process for including new scam offences into the Schedule to the Bill. We will consider including a new offence into the Schedule if it has a nexus to scams, such as offences related to cheating or fraud. The Minister for Home Affairs can amend the Schedule to include the new offences.
Issuance of RO
7. Mr Neil Parekh asked what the minimum threshold for issuing a Restriction Order would be. Ms Ng Ling Ling and Ms Usha Chandradas asked how the threshold of “reasonable belief” would be established, when assessing whether a Restriction Order should be issued, renewed, or cancelled.
8. A Restriction Order can be issued once two conditions are satisfied: (i) first, there is reason to believe that the victim is likely to make a monetary transfer to a scammer, withdraw money and give it to a scammer, or apply for draw down from a credit facility with the intention of benefitting a scammer and (ii) second, a Restriction Order is necessary to protect a scam victim, having regard to the time required to engage the victim and implement risk mitigation measures. Officers will assess every case based on the specific facts and circumstances. This is what the Police are trained to do in the course of any investigation. As an example, in their assessment, the Police will consider factors such as: (i) whether the victim is still in communication with the scammer; (ii) whether the victim has transferred monies to the scammer; (iii) whether the victim continues to believe the scammer; and (iv) whether the victim is likely to transfer money to a scammer.
9. Assoc Prof Razwana asked about what it means for the attempts by the Police to convince the individual have being “exhausted”. Ms Usha Chandradas asked whether parents can be involved in the risk mitigation measures, and what “other circumstances” we have in mind when determining whether a Restriction Order is required to protect the victim. Our policy intent is for the Restriction Orders to be issued as a last resort. By extension, this means that wherever feasible, we intend to explore other interventions first, and to only issue a Restriction Order if these other interventions fail. These interventions could include engaging the relatives of the victim or other persons, which could include the victim’s parents where appropriate. We have drafted the legal provision broadly to empower the Police to take into account the specific circumstances of the case, which can vary significantly, when making their assessments.
10. Ms Ng Ling Ling asked whether the responsibility should ultimately rest with the victim, if the Police are unable to convince the victim of the scam. Ms Hazel Poa suggested to allow individuals to opt out of the Restriction Order regime, given that they have the right to determine the use of their monies. As pointed out by Ms Ng and Ms Poa, it is indeed our policy intent to balance between protecting an individual from harm and respecting the individual’s autonomy and personal responsibility. This is why the Restriction Order is meant to be a measure of last resort and is only issued temporarily – for a maximum of 30 days at the outset, and extended up to five times if necessary. The Restriction Order will lapse after the maximum number of renewals, even if the individual remains set on transferring monies to the scammer.
11. As I have mentioned in my opening speech, we cannot handhold the victim indefinitely. But we will do all that we can, while the Restriction Order is in force, to bring the individual to his senses. If the individual persists in making transfers to scammers after the maximum Restriction Order period, the responsibility must lie with the individual.
12. Mr Gan Thiam Poh asked if the Government would consider lowering the threshold to issue a Restriction Order, in order to minimise scam losses. He also asked if a third party would be subject to a Restriction Order, if the third party assists an individual who is subjected to a Restriction Order to transfer monies to the scammers.
13. Indeed, the authorities have to intervene decisively in scam cases, in order to protect the individual and minimise losses. However, imposing a Restriction Order entails causing significant inconvenience to the individual subjected to the Restriction Order. It is therefore important for officers to carry out due diligence so that they can assess whether a Restriction Order is warranted, and avoid, or at least minimise, the mistakes in blocking an account that Mr Yip cautioned against. Our view is that the current threshold stipulated in the Bill is appropriate. Officers will issue a Restriction Order if they have reason to believe that the individual will make monetary transfers to a scammer, withdraw any money and give it to a scammer, or apply for or draw down from any credit facility with the intention of benefitting a scammer.
14. The Restriction Order will only restrict banking transactions and credit facilities of the individual, but not that of a third party assisting an individual to make monetary transfers. However, if the third party is also an unwitting victim of the scammer, and similarly at risk of making monetary transfers of his or her own to the scammer, then the officers may similarly consider whether that individual should be the subject of a separate Restriction Order.
15. Mr Sharael Taha asked how Restriction Orders can be issued in an efficient manner, such that it is effective in preventing victims from transferring further funds to scammers.
16. We recognise that speed is of the essence in preventing losses, but the Police must also conduct the necessary investigations to determine if a case has met the threshold for issuance of a Restriction Order. The Police will also work closely with the banks, which are co-located at the Anti-Scam Command, in their investigations and in effecting the restrictions on the victim’s bank account.
17. Ms Hazel Poa asked if Restriction Orders would be applicable to joint accounts, and noted that doing so would inconvenience the joint account holders who are not subject to a Restriction Order.
18. There are two types of joint accounts – Joint-Alternate accounts where each account holder can perform banking transactions without the consent of the other account holders, and Joint-All accounts where all account holders must give their instruction for any bank transaction.
19. The Ministry of Home Affairs would prefer to take a risk-calibrated approach by imposing the Restriction Orders on Joint-Alternate accounts and exempting Joint-All accounts given their lower risk of being depleted through scams. However, the banks have informed us that it would be operationally challenging for them to implement such a proposal. Hence, we have decided to impose the Restriction Orders on both types of joint accounts for a start. This is not ideal, but we have decided to go ahead with the Bill at this juncture, to provide victims with the necessary protection at the soonest. We will continue to work with the banks to explore the possibility of putting in place technical solutions to facilitate such exemptions in the future. We will notify all joint account holders should a Restriction Order be imposed. We will also facilitate their access of monies in the joint accounts.
Involvement of Family Members
20. Members have asked how family members of individuals would be involved and consulted when a Restriction Order is being issued, cancelled, or renewed, and whether family members or banks can initiate for the Police to consider issuing a Restriction Order. Mr Sharael Taha asked if the issuance of a Restriction Order should be contingent on a valid complaint lodged by a credible party, such as a family member.
21. Members of the public, including a victim’s family members, can make a Police report when they suspect that an individual or their family member has encountered a scam. The Police will conduct investigations and assess if a Restriction Order should be issued. In determining whether a Restriction Order should be issued, the Police may engage the victim’s family members to assess if there is reason to believe that the victim is being scammed, and to explore whether it would suffice for the family to intervene and convince the individual that he or she is the victim of a scam, without the need for a Restriction Order. Family members may also bring in social workers and counsellors to help convince the victim.
22. That said, the issuance of a Restriction Order is not contingent on a police report by a family member or other third parties, as this may not be necessary and may even delay our efforts to protect the victim. For example, the Police may uncover potential scam victims in the course of investigating mule accounts, or the Police may be alerted by bank staff of an individual who is suspected to be a scam victim. For such cases, it is not necessary and may be less efficient to require a family member or other third party to file a police report. The Police are required to perform due diligence checks and will issue a Restriction Order if the threshold for issuance is met.
23. Mr Jamus Lim asked if a trusted friend or relative could be empowered to freeze transactions, in lieu of the Police. Earlier in my opening speech, I had provided an example where, if the victim and the sibling agree to an arrangement where the sibling will monitor the victim’s transactions via a joint account and can advise the victim against making further transfers to the scammer, the specified officer may not issue a Restriction Order. That said, I would like to reiterate that the decision to issue an RO will be made by the Police. The Police would have been engaging with the individual and his family members for some time, and the Police would be in the best position to make an objective and informed decision.
24. Mr Gerald Giam asked about the estimated number of Restriction Orders that would be issued in a year and the potential losses that could have been avoided if we had implemented this earlier.
25. The Police do not currently track the number of cases where Police officers have been activated to engage potential victims, as well as the number of successful and unsuccessful interventions. Notwithstanding, based on the Police’s experience, we expect to issue five to 10 Restriction Orders per month, mainly for scam victims. The actual number will depend on the cases that are brought to the Police’s attention and their assessment of each case.
Support for Individuals
26. Ms Hazel Poa and Assoc Prof Razwana noted that some victims may be emotionally affected when being prevented from sending money to the scammer, and asked how the Police intend to support such individuals in the course of them being subjected to an RO. Ms Hazel Poa also suggested for MHA to require the Police to take into account the views of a social worker before issuing a Restriction Order.
27. As I have mentioned, speed is of the essence in order to protect these individuals and minimise losses, which in some cases might involve all of the victim’s life savings. Hence, a Restriction Order will be issued once the Police have assessed that the conditions for an issuance are satisfied. Notwithstanding, victims who require emotional support during the process may inform the investigation officer, who will arrange for them to speak to a victim care officer. The Ministry of Home Affairs will work with the Police on the operational details to ensure that victims are adequately supported.
28. I have made available copies of a pamphlet with FAQs for victims of scams, and avenues for them to consult mental well-being, counselling and other financial assistance channels. This copy, a resource guide, is available for members at the entrance and exits of the Parliamentary chambers. There is a section called “Where can I seek support?”, that directs victims to support from Victim Care Officers and to community support, in the form of mental well-being and counselling support.
Access to Funds
29. Mr Neil Parekh asked about the process for individuals to apply to lift or modify a Restriction Order. Mr Yip Hon Weng asked how quickly a restriction on an account can be lifted, especially if a wrong account gets blocked. Ms Ng Ling Ling asked if there would be mechanisms to allow an individual who is subjected to a Restriction Order to access limited funds for his daily expenses while investigations are underway. Mr Sharael Taha and Ms Hazel Poa suggested for an individual subjected to a Restriction Order to have immediate access to sufficient funds, instead of having to apply for it.
30. We understand the need to minimise inconvenience to the affected individual. However, we are also mindful that the scammer may exploit any channel through which the individual can gain access to money. We will therefore take a risk-calibrated approach, by allowing an individual who is the subject of a Restriction Order to apply to the Police for access to a fixed amount of monies for living expenses. The MHA and MAS are working with the banks on the operational details, including the amount of time required to impose or to lift a Restrictio Order. Our intent is to ensure that this is done as quickly as possible – so, we are talking about hours, not days. Notwithstanding, if the bank makes a mistake in complying with the Restriction Order and blocks a wrong account, the bank should rectify the mistake immediately.
31. Ms Hazel Poa asked if an individual can be exempted from certain legitimate facilities such as GIRO bill payments, or have any financial penalties arising from late bill payments waived, during the period where the Restriction Order is in effect. Ms Poa also asked what proof an individual would need to show for withdrawals, how will the Police determine the quantum of the withdrawals, and whether the amount withdrawn would be subjected to further restrictions or monitoring.
32. If the individual requires additional amounts of money, the individual can apply to the Police to vary the Restriction Order to allow a specific transfer or withdrawal by showing proof of the need to access these amounts. This could include, for example, bill statements, such as for medical expenses, utility and rental payments, or any documentation as requested by the Police. Every request will be assessed on a case-by-case basis, based on the needs of each individual. This amount will not be subjected to further restriction or monitoring, since it has been assessed to be necessary for the individual.
33. The Ministry of Home Affairs agrees with Ms Poa’s suggestion and has in fact considered exempting individuals from certain legitimate facilities such as GIRO bill payments. However, the banks have informed us that it is not feasible to exempt selected transactions from the Restriction Order without significant system changes. Again, this is not ideal but we have decided to go ahead with the Bill at this juncture, given the importance of providing victims with the necessary protection at the soonest. But we hear your feedback and we will continue to work with banks towards allowing for these exemptions.
34. On the question of lead time required before an individual can access his funds – once the Police have assessed if the individual should be allowed access to funds, the Police will work with the banks to arrange for the individual to make the withdrawal at a bank branch. We are working with the banks on the operational details, and our intent is to ensure that this is done as quickly as possible.
Specified Officers and Appeals
35. Ms Usha Chandradas, Mr Sharael Taha and Assoc Prof Razwana asked who the specified officers engaging the individuals would be, including their seniority and qualification, and how the Ministry of Home Affairs would ensure that these powers are not subject to abuse. Mr Neil Parekh, Mr Yip Hon Weng and Ms Usha Chandradas asked about the documentation requirements for an appeal, how long it would take for the Commissioner of Police to review an appeal, and whether hearings should be allowed for appeals. Mr Yip also asked if the Government would conduct regular reviews on the decisions regarding appeals or publish anonymised outcomes of such appeals.
36. I trust that Members will agree with me that our officers can be expected to perform their duties professionally and impartially. The Police will institute internal controls such that the initial approving authority for Restriction Orders will reside with the Director of the Commercial Affairs Department or, in his absence, a Deputy Director of the Commercial Affairs Department.
37. To ensure no conflict of interest in the appeals process, appeals will be decided by the Commissioner of Police, whose decision is final. The appeal process has been designed with speed in mind, to ensure that an appeal can be decided expeditiously, issued judiciously, and officers are held accountable for the exercise of this power. The Ministry of Home Affairs will prescribe in Subsidiary Legislation the documents and information an individual will need to provide when submitting an appeal. These would include, but are not limited to, (i) any evidence that the individual has taken up additional safeguards willingly and therefore the Restriction Order is no longer required for his protection, and (ii) any evidence that the individual is not a target of scams, such as proof that the other party is legitimate.
38. On Assoc Prof Razwana’s suggestion for individuals subject to a Restriction Order to be automatically referred for independent legal advice – individuals are free to seek their own legal advice and avail themselves of the appeal mechanism.
39. In operationalising the Bill, we will ensure that victims are adequately supported, and appeals are fairly assessed. I would also like to remind Members that the Police will always try to engage the victim before deciding whether to proceed with a Restriction Order, since the Restriction Order is intended to be a lever of last resort. So we will not have a situation where the Police decides to proceed with the Restriction Order without trying to find out the perspective of the victim first.
Immunity and Penalties
40. Mr Neil Parekh asked about the limits of immunity granted to banks and their staff, particularly in cases of unintentional errors. A bank and its officer, employee or agent will be protected from criminal and civil liability for any act or omission in complying with a Restriction Order. The immunity applies only if the act was done or the omission was made with reasonable care and in good faith.
41. Mr Yip Hon Weng asked if imposing a fine of up to $3,000 on banks for contravening a restriction order without reasonable excuse is sufficient. This is in line with the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) Section 35(6), which is in relation to banks being ordered by the Police to seize property held in their account or safe deposit box. Thus, it is a close approximate to the current order to freeze the bank account of the suspected scam victim. Mr Sharael Taha suggested for banks to be held liable for losses incurred resulting from their failure to comply with a Restriction Order, in addition to a heftier maximum fine quantum. He also asked if banks could additionally be mandated to stop transactions, if informed by a victim that the transactions were fraudulent.
42. I would like to say that there is a strong level of cooperation between the Police and the banks at the Anti-Scam Command. This partnership has helped to stop many scams, even without the Restriction Order regime.
43. As I have mentioned, the MHA shares the desire to minimise inconveniences for the affected individual. However, to guard against the risk of abuse, any request for funds will have to be assessed based on facts and circumstances of each case. Upon application by an individual to the Police, he will be allowed to withdraw a fixed sum of money, which will be reasonable and sufficient for basic sustenance, including their bill payments which I had mentioned earlier. Should the individual request more money thereafter, the Police will require him to show proof of the need to access the money. This is to avoid the risk of scammers exploiting this mechanism to obtain monies from the individual.
44. Mr Jamus Lim asked if the definition of scams covered by the Bill is sufficient, given that it may be difficult to distinguish between scams and traditional cheating cases.
45. The Police regard scams as cheating offences that are conducted remotely, online or over telecommunications. Traditional cheating, on the other hand, involves mostly physical interactions, where the other party is known to the individual in real life. However, as pointed out by Mr Lim, the Police have indeed observed cases where scammers introduced elements of physical interaction to strengthen the deception. and we have amended the Bill to ensure that the Restriction Orders can be applied in such cases.
46. The offences in the law include cheating and offences under the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1992 and the Computer Misuse Act 1993. These offences cover the full range of acts that constitute or facilitate scams. To send a stronger deterrent signal, guidelines issued by the Sentencing Advisory Panel have recommended higher sentences for acts that facilitate scams.
47. I will now cover other issues and suggestions from Members. As these matters fall outside the scope of this Bill, I will address them very briefly.
48. Mr Gan Thiam Poh asked if the Ministry of Home Affairs would consider getting the banks to increase the number of checks required before a fund transfer can be allowed, to buy the authorities more time to engage and convince the individual.
49. Banks have improved their real-time fraud surveillance in detecting possible fraudulent transactions. Today, bank staff may call up their customers to verify their transactions, if suspicious activity is detected. Cooling periods, such as those for the activation of digital tokens and other high-risk activities, will help to slow down selected transactions and give individuals more time to think about the transfers. Ultimately, banks will have to balance between fraud prevention and customer experience, as they consider ways to enhance their anti-scam measures.
50. Mr Yip Hon Weng and Assoc Prof Razwana asked if the Government could provide banks with the necessary guidelines, training or support to ensure that banks are able to distinguish a scam from a legitimate transaction. Members had also asked if the Ministry of Home Affairs would consider having periodic reviews of banks’ processes or facilitate sharing of best practices among banks, to ensure implementation effectiveness across the board. Mr Neil Parekh also asked if it would be useful to establish a single regulatory body to coordinate the processes among the banks, the regulatory authorities and the officers. Mr Gerald Giam also suggested for real-time coordination between the Police, the MAS, the banks and other platforms to enhance enforcement against scams.
51. There are ongoing efforts to do so. Since 2022, the Anti-Scam Command and MAS have worked with the major retail banks in Singapore to co-locate the banks’ staff within the Anti-Scam Command. This has greatly enhanced the banks’ real-time coordination with the Police to distinguish a scam from a legitimate transaction, trace fund flows, and freeze bank accounts suspected to be involved in scammers’ operations. We welcome other stakeholders, including social media platforms, to co-locate within the Anti-Scam Command, to improve real-time coordination. The Police also regularly share observations with banks, to improve their fraud detection capabilities. This model has worked well, and we will continue to build upon it to strengthen enforcement against scammers and recovery of scam proceeds. We agree with the suggestion to facilitate the sharing of best practices amongst banks and are considering how to do so efficiently and effectively.
52. Ms Ng Ling Ling and Mr Gerald Giam raised a number of suggestions to tackle scams, including on the Shared Responsibility Framework, Money Lock and Kill Switch. These are outside the scope of the Bill and MPs may wish to file Parliamentary Questions on this. Ms Usha Chandradas also suggested for the Ministry of Home Affairs to consider including art as a tool to address the root causes behind the perpetration of scams by victims. We note the Members’ suggestions and will take them into account, as we review our overall approach to tackle scams.
53. Mr Yip Hon Weng suggested for the Government to strengthen cross-border enforcement against scams and do more to educate the public on scams. Cross-border enforcement is indeed a priority, given the transnational nature of scams. The Police have strong operational ties with their counterparts in key jurisdictions and work with international organisations such as the INTERPOL to exchange information and conduct joint investigations.
54. But, importantly, it would be even better to prevent such scams from materialising in the first place. This is why we fully agree with Mr Yip that public education is a critical area of work. We recently launched the ScamShield Suite to make scam resources easily accessible to the public. The new 1799 helpline, which operates 24/7, offers the public an easy option to check with whenever they are unsure if a situation they are facing is a scam. The Ministry of Home Affairs will share more on our public education initiatives at the upcoming Committee of Supply debate.
Conclusion
55. Mr Speaker, Sir, fighting scams is a whole-of-society effort. The threat will keep evolving, and we must ensure that we have the appropriate tools to deal with this threat, as this Bill aims to do. We will continue to evolve our methods, evolve our laws, to continue our fight against scams.
56. I thank the Members for your support of the Bill. I beg to move.
