1. The Anti-Money Laundering and Other Matters Bill was introduced for First Reading in Parliament today.
Background
2. The Government regularly reviews our laws to ensure that they remain effective against the evolving crime landscape. The Anti-Money Laundering and Other Matters Bill seeks to:
(a) Enhance the ability of our law enforcement agencies (LEAs) to pursue and prosecute money laundering (ML) offences;
(b) Clarify and improve our processes to deal with seized or restrained properties linked to suspected criminal activities; and
(c) Align our Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) framework for casino operators with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards.[1]
Key Amendments
Enhance the ability of LEAs to pursue and prosecute ML offences
Enhance levers for prosecution of ML cases arising from criminal conduct abroad
3. Currently, to prosecute ML offences, the Prosecution needs to show that the monies allegedly laundered in Singapore are proceeds directly linked to specific criminal conduct. In cases where the criminal conduct is committed outside Singapore, the authorities are required to show the complete trail of the monies from the point the crime was committed overseas to the point the monies were deposited with the money launderer.
4. In many cases, LEAs face challenges in obtaining the requisite evidence from foreign victims, entities and authorities. This is especially so if the criminal proceeds had flowed through many jurisdictions before entering Singapore. Please see
Annex for an illustrative example.
5. The Bill will amend the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act (CDSA) such that the Prosecution need not show the direct link between the criminal conduct and the monies allegedly laundered in Singapore. It will be sufficient for the Prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the money launderer knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that he was dealing with criminal proceeds. This will facilitate the prosecution of money mules in cases where the monies laundered had passed through bank accounts and intermediaries in foreign jurisdictions, before entering Singapore.
Designate foreign environmental crimes as ML predicate offences
6. Currently, LEAs are only able to investigate ML offences arising from the commission of an offence outside Singapore if the foreign offence is also a serious offence under Singapore’s laws. As environmental offences such as illegal mining, illegal waste trafficking, or illegal logging do not apply in our domestic context, they are not recognised as serious offences in Singapore, thereby limiting our ability to investigate ML associated with such offences.
7. The Bill will introduce a Third Schedule to the CDSA, designating serious foreign environmental crimes as ML predicate offences. This will allow LEAs to investigate ML offences if it is suspected that the monies in Singapore are derived from such crimes committed overseas.
Enable cross-agency data sharing to enhance the detection of ML, TF and PF
8. The Bill will introduce amendments to the Income Tax Act; the Goods and Services Tax Act; the Regulation of Imports and Exports Act; and the Free Trade Zones Act; to enhance authorities’ ability to detect ML, TF, and PF.[2]
9. The amendments will allow government agencies, namely the Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore and Singapore Customs, to share tax data and trade data respectively with Singapore’s Financial Intelligence Unit, the Suspicious Transaction Reporting Office (STRO) of the Commercial Affairs Department of the Singapore Police Force. Amendments will also be made to the CDSA to allow AML/CFT regulators, such as the Council for Estate Agencies and the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority, to have access to suspicious transaction reports filed by their respective regulated entities.
10. The sharing of such data will enable STRO to augment its analyses on ML, TF and PF risks and provide richer intelligence to LEAs and government AML/CFT regulators. Regulators will also have a better overview of the existing and emerging ML, TF, PF risks and trends relating to their sectors and be able to take AML/CFT supervisory and regulatory actions earlier and more effectively.
Clarify and improve processes to deal with seized or restrained properties linked to suspected criminal activities
Allow the sale of seized or restrained properties
11. Currently, when seized or restrained property is no longer required for investigations or court proceedings, LEAs must obtain the consent of all parties involved if they want to obtain a court order to sell the property. LEAs may want to do so in order to avoid further maintenance and management costs, and/or further depreciation of the value of the property, pending conclusion of the case, and decision on the disposal of the property by the Court. If there is no consensus amongst the parties, LEAs have to continue to manage and maintain the property. Significant costs are incurred by the authorities to maintain and manage some types of property under seizure or restraint, such as vehicles, vessels, and livestock. The value of such properties may also depreciate over time, thereby affecting the realisable value of the seized or restrained assets.
12. The Bill will amend the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) and the CDSA to allow the Court to order the sale of seized or restrained properties linked to suspected criminal activities, where the Police or Public Prosecutor applies for the sale of the property, and:
(a) All parties consent to the sale;
(b) The value of the property is likely to depreciate, or undue costs are involved in maintaining the property; or
(c) The sale would be in the interest of justice.
13. The amendments will allow LEAs to reduce the cost of property maintenance and preserve the value of seized or restrained properties, to enhance subsequent asset recovery and restitution to victims.
Deal with seized properties linked to suspects who have absconded
14. In the course of investigations, LEAs may seize properties linked to persons who are suspected of having committed offences under Singapore’s laws and cannot be found (e.g. left the country). Investigations can be wilfully stalled by such absconded persons if they decide to not cooperate with investigations.
15. The current processes for dealing with seized properties linked to absconded persons are unclear, and the CPC is silent on this issue. The proposed amendments will provide for the following:
(a) Where LEAs apply to the Court for continued seizure of properties, the Court must not dispose of the properties if it is satisfied that there are ongoing investigations into the absconded person; and
(b) An absconded person will be required to personally present himself to the LEA for investigations, before he can make a claim to the seized properties.
16. Taken together, these amendments will prevent the premature release of seized properties while investigations are ongoing, and avoid a situation where an absconded person evades investigations by staying out of Singapore, and makes a successful claim to the seized properties because investigations have not been able to proceed.
Align AML/CFT framework for casino operators with FATF standards
17. The Bill will also amend the Casino Control Act to tighten requirements for casino operators to conduct customer due diligence (CDD) checks for the detection and prevention of ML/TF/PF.
18. Casino operators are currently required to perform CDD checks on patrons, when the casino operator enters a single cash transaction involving S$10,000 or more, or receives S$5,000 or more in a single transaction to be deposited into a deposit account.
19. To align our processes with the FATF standards, the changes will require casino operators to also consider PF risks when conducting CDD checks. The Gambling Regulatory Authority of Singapore will be empowered to issue regulations requiring casino operators to detect or prevent PF. In addition, the quantum for when CDD checks is required will be lowered to cover cash transactions or deposits involving S$4,000 or more.
[1] The FATF is an intergovernmental body that develops international standards to fight ML, terrorism financing (TF) and proliferation financing (PF). Singapore is a member of the FATF.
[2] “Proliferation financing” refers to the act of providing funds or financial services for the illicit development and supply of weapons of mass destruction and related materials. At the FATF, proliferation financing risks refer to the potential breach, non-implementation or evasion of targeted financial sanctions obligations imposed by relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions.
Annex
1. Illustrative Example of Current Approach for Prosecution of ML Cases Arising From Criminal Conduct Abroad (PDF, 97KB)
