Assessment of Carousell’s and Meta’s Enhanced Verification Measures Under the E-commerce Code of the Online Criminal Harms Act

1. Under the E-Commerce Code of the Online Criminal Harms Act (OCHA), Carousell, Facebook Marketplace and Facebook Advertisements carried out a six-month pilot to apply user verification against Government-issued records (“enhanced verification”) on selected sellers and advertisers. With the conclusion of the pilots, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has decided on the following:

(a) To extend the assessment period of Carousell’s pilot for an additional six months, until 30 June 2025;

(b) To allow Facebook Marketplace to continue implementing enhanced verification for selected sellers, i.e. not to require verification for all sellers; and

(c) For Facebook Advertisements, MHA welcomes Meta’s decision to verify the identities of all advertisers by end-June 2025.

2. The OCHA empowers the Competent Authority, sited within the Singapore Police Force, to issue Code(s) of Practice (COP) to require providers of designated online services to put in place appropriate systems, processes or measures to proactively disrupt scams and malicious cyber activities affecting people in Singapore.  ^[1]

 

3. The COP for E-Commerce Services (“E-Commerce Code”) took effect on 26 June 2024 and is applicable to the following designated online services. These online services facilitate e-commerce activities and pose the highest risks of e-commerce scams in Singapore: ^[2]

(a) Carousell

(b) Facebook Marketplace

(c) Facebook Advertisements 

(d) Facebook Pages 

4. Providers of these designated online services are required to put in place the following measures, that MHA assesses to be critical in protecting Singapore end-users from e-commerce scams:

(a) Subject users who advertise or post about the sales of goods and/or services, or those who intend to do so, to verification against Government-issued records (“enhanced verification requirement”); and

(b) Provide, as an option for users, payment protection mechanisms that require delivery of goods or services to be verified, before payment is released to the sellers (“payment protection requirement”). 

5. In line with a risk-calibrated and outcome-based approach, MHA had allowed the designated online services to only apply the enhanced verification requirement on selected sellers and advertisers for a start. Should the e-commerce scam situation fail to improve, MHA would require the services to expand the coverage of the enhanced verification requirement, such that more sellers and advertisers would need to have their identities verified. The timelines were as follows:

(a) Carousell.  Between 1 July and 31 December 2024, MHA would assess the effectiveness of Carousell’s measures to verify the identities of selected sellers. If the number of e-commerce scams reported on Carousell did not drop significantly, MHA would require Carousell to verify the identities of all sellers by 1 April 2025.

 

(b) Facebook. 

(i) Marketplace. Between 1 June and 30 November 2024, MHA would assess the effectiveness of Facebook’s measures to verify the identities of selected sellers on Marketplace. If the number of e-commerce scams reported on Marketplace did not drop significantly, MHA would require Facebook to verify the identities of all Marketplace sellers by 1 March 2025.

(ii) Advertisements. Between 1 July and 31 December 2024, MHA would assess the effectiveness of Facebook’s measures to verify the identities of selected advertisers. If the number of scam reports arising from advertisements on Facebook did not drop significantly, MHA would require Facebook to verify the identities of all advertisers by 1 April 2025.

(iii) Pages. MHA had waived the requirements under the E-Commerce Code for Facebook Pages for the time being, to allow Facebook to prioritise implementing the enhanced verification requirement for Marketplace and Advertisements.

(c) As for the requirement on payment protection mechanisms (mentioned in para 4b above), MHA had waived this requirement for the time being, to allow the services to prioritise implementing the enhanced verification requirement, but would reassess in 2025. 

6. Based on SPF’s scam statistics, the number of reported e-commerce scams on Carousell decreased by about 11% over the assessment period (i.e. from June 2024 to December 2024).  While this was not a significant decrease, it was a decreasing trend, and Carousell has demonstrated willingness and proactiveness to work with us on various anti-scam measures.

7. Given this, MHA will not mandate the enhanced verification requirement for all Carousell sellers, for now. Instead, we will extend the assessment period of Carousell’s pilot by an additional six months (i.e. until June 2025). If the number of e-commerce scams reported on Carousell does not drop significantly by then, MHA may require Carousell to verify the identities of all sellers by 1 October 2025.

8. The number of reported e-commerce scams on Facebook Marketplace decreased by about 55% over the assessment period (i.e. from May to November 2024). 

9. Given the significant improvement, MHA will not mandate the enhanced verification requirement for all Marketplace sellers. That said, we will continue to monitor the e-commerce scams situation on Marketplace, and may require Meta to verify the identities of more sellers should the situation worsen.

10. The number of scam reports arising from advertisements on Facebook increased by about 12% over the assessment period (i.e. from June to December 2024). 

11. MHA notes that Meta’s verification requirements were restricted to paid advertisements, while the SPF’s statistics on scam advertisements comprise both paid advertisements and unpaid posts and advertisements (e.g. on Facebook Pages), due to limitations in the way the data is reported to the SPF. 

12. MHA notes that Meta intends to verify the identities of all advertisers ^[3] on Facebook by end-June 2025. We welcome this and will monitor the situation.

13. MHA has observed a significant proportion of e-commerce scams being perpetrated on Facebook Pages. Specifically, scammers would create Facebook Pages under the pretext of advertising the sale of goods and services, to reach out to and deceive victims. 

14. MHA is working with Meta to introduce the enhanced verification requirement for Facebook Pages in 2025. In line with an outcome-based approach, MHA will allow Meta to apply the verification requirements only to selected Pages for a start. 

15. Similar to our approach for Facebook Marketplace and Advertisements, MHA will assess the effectiveness of Facebook Pages’ measures for a period.  If the scam numbers do not decrease significantly, we may require stronger measures to be implemented, such as requiring Facebook to apply verification requirements to all Pages. More details will be shared later.

 

16. MHA will continue to waive the requirement on payment protection mechanisms for the time being. This allows designated online services to focus their resources on their other anti-scam measures, including enhanced verification, for now. 

17. To be effective in tackling scams, the Government and industry stakeholders must work collaboratively. We thank Meta and Carousell for working with us in this regard, including through technical measures and public education initiatives.  We look forward to our continued collaboration. 

---

[1] Refer to Annex A for more details of the COPs, including the online services designated and the requirements imposed.

[2] Refer to Annex B (PDF, 122 KB) for a breakdown of e-commerce scams reported by online platforms.

[3] These are advertisers who pay for advertisements on Facebook. 


Annex

1. Annex A – Details of Online Criminal Harms Act Code(s) of Practice

2. Annex B - Number of E-commerce Scams by Approach Modality (PDF, 122 KB)